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Abstract
Cryptography algorithm standards play a key role both to the practice of information security
and to cryptography theory research. Among them, the MQV and HMQV protocols ((H)MQV, in
short) are a family of (implicitly authenticated) Diffie-Hellman key-exchange (DHKE) protocols that
are widely standardized and deployed. In this work, from some new perspectives and approaches and
under some new design rationales and insights, we develop a new family of practical implicitly authen-
ticated DHKE protocols, which enjoy notable performance among security, privacy, efficiency and
easy deployment. We make detailed comparisons between our new DHKE protocols and (H)MQV,
showing that the newly developed protocols outperform HMQV in most aspects. Along the way,
guided by our new design rationales, we also identify a new vulnerability of (H)MQV, which brings
some new perspectives (e.g., session-key computational fairness) to the literature.
1 Introduction
Diffie-Hellman key-exchange (DHKE) protocols [21] are at the root of public-key cryptography, and are
one of the main pillars of both theory and practice of cryptography [14]. Among them, the (H)MQV
protocols [44, 40, 37, 45] are among the most efficient DHKE protocols that provide (implicit) mutual au-
thentications based upon public-key cryptography, and are widely standardized [4, 5, 34, 35, 49, 50, 56].
In particular, it has been announced by the US National Security Agency as the key exchange mecha-
nism underlying “the next generation cryptography to protect US government information”, including
the protection of “classified or mission critical national security information” [50, 37].
Despite its seemingly conceptual simplicity, designing “sound” and “right” DHKE protocols turns
out to be extremely error prone and can be notoriously subtle, particularly witnessed by the evolution
history of (H)MQV [44, 36, 40, 37, 45]. Also, the analysis of even a simple cryptographic protocol in
intricate adversarial settings like the Internet can be a luxury and dauntingly complex task [11, 37].
The reason for this is the high system complexity and enormous number of subtleties surrounding the
design, definition and analysis of DHKE protocols. Given the intensive investigation of (H)MQV both
from cryptography theory research and from industrial engineering, it may be commonly suggested that
the state-of-the-art of (H)MQV, commonly viewed as the best available in the integrity of security and
protocol efficiency, should hardly be broken.
In this work, we start with investigating highly practical mechanisms in the random oracle (RO)
model, referred to as non-malleable joint proof-of-knowledge (NMJPOK) for presentation simplicity,
for proving DH-knowledges, say both the secret-key and the DH-exponent, jointly and non-malleably
in concurrent settings like the Internet. In light of this line of investigations, we develop a new family
of practical implicitly authenticated DHKE protocols, referred to as OAKE 1 and single-hash OAKE
protocols, which enjoy notable performance among security, privacy, efficiency and easy deployment.
For presentation simplicity, we refer to the newly developed DHKE protocols as (s)OAKE. We then
compare and justify (s)OAKE protocols with (H)MQV in detail, which shows that our new protocols
outperform HMQV in most aspects. Detailed comparisons are listed in Section 4 after motivating the
design rationales and building tools and after presenting the detailed OAKE specifications. Guided
by our new design rationales, in this work we particularly identify a new vulnerability of (H)MQV
beyond the Canetti-Krawczyk (CK) framework, which brings some new perspectives (e.g., session-key
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1There are two acronym interpretations of OAKE. One interpretation is: (Online) Optimal (implicitly) Authenti-
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(Diffie-Hellman) Key-Exchange (in the integrity of protocol efficiency, security, privacy and easy deployment).
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computational fairness) to the literature. We do not know how to fix (H)MQV against this newly
identified vulnerability without sacrificing the provable security in the CK framework and many more
other advantages enjoyed by (s)OAKE (with details referred to Section 4.2), which also further justifies
and highlights the careful design of (s)OAKE.
We suggest the developed (s)OAKE protocols are themselves a clear witness to the usefulness of
the new design rationales and building tool with NMJPOK, as (s)OAKE aims for an alternative of
(H)MQV that is widely standardized and deployed and as with the new design rationales we can
identify some new vulnerabilities bringing new perspectives to the literature of DHKE. But at the same
time, the new design rationales and building tools, developed for (s)OAKE, can also be of independent
interest, and may trigger more applications. In particular, based on this work, in a subsequent separate
work we present the definition and candidates of non-malleable extractable one-way functions (NME-
OWF), which can be viewed as pairing-based NMJPOK without random oracles, and demonstrate the
applications of NME-OWF to both theory (e.g., 3-round concurrent non-malleable zero-knowledge, etc)
and applications (e.g., ID-based cryptography, etc) of cryptography.
2 Preliminaries
Notations: If A is a probabilistic algorithm, then A(x1, x2, · · · ; r) is the result of running A on inputs
x1, x2, · · · and coins r. We let y ← A(x1, x2, · · · ; r) denote the experiment of picking r at random and
letting y be A(x1, x2, · · · ; r). If S is a finite set then x ← S, sometimes also written as x ∈R S, is the
operation of picking an element uniformly from S. If α is neither an algorithm nor a set then x← α is
a simple assignment statement.
Let G′ be a finite Abelian group of order N , G be a subgroup of prime order q in G′. Denote by g
a generator of G, by 1G the identity element, by G \ 1G = G − {1G} the set of elements of G except
1G and by t =
N
q the cofactor. In this work, we use multiplicative notation for the group operation
in G′. We assume the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption holds over G, which says that
given X = gx, Y = gy ← G (i.e., each of x and y is taken uniformly at random from Zq) no efficient
(say, probabilistic polynomial-time) algorithm can compute CDH(X,Y ) = gxy. Let (A = ga, a) (resp.,
(X = gx, x)) be the public-key and secret-key (resp., the DH-component and DH-exponent) of player
Aˆ, and (B = gb, b) (resp., (Y = gy, y)) be the public-key and secret-key (resp., the DH-component and
DH-exponent) of player Bˆ, where a, x, b, y are taken randomly and independently from Z∗q . (H)MQV is
recalled in Figure 1 (page 4), and the (H)MQV variants are recalled in Appendix A, where on a security
parameter k HK (resp., h) is a hash function of k-bit (resp., l-bit) output and l is set to be |q|/2.
Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption [51]. Let G be a cyclic group generated by an element
g, and a decision predicate algorithm O be a (full) Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) Oracle for the group
G and generator g such that on input (U, V, Z), for arbitrary (U, V ) ∈ G2, oracle O outputs 1 if and
only if Z = CDH(U, V ). We say the GDH assumption holds in G if for any polynomial-time CDH
solver for G, the probability that on a pair of random elements (X,Y ) ← G the solver computes the
correct value CDH(X,Y ) is negligible, even when the algorithm is provided with the (full) DDH-oracle
O for G. The probability is taken over the random coins of the solver, and the choice of X,Y (each one
of them is taken uniformly at random in G).
Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption (KEA). Informally speaking, the KEA assumption says
that, suppose on input (g,C = gc), where c is taken uniformly at random from Z∗q , a probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) algorithm A outputs (Y,Z = Y c) ∈ G2, then the discrete logarithm y of Y = gy
can be efficiently extracted from the input (g,C) and the random coins used by A. The formal definition
is referred to Definition G.3 (page 39). In other words, given (g,C = gc) the “only way” to produce
(Y,Z = Y c) is to choose y and compute (Y = gy, Z = Cy). The KEA assumption is derived from
the CDH assumption, and is a non-black-box assumption by nature [7]. The KEA assumption was
introduced in [17], and has been used in many subsequent works (e.g., [32, 8, 7, 19, 37, 18, 20], etc).
In particular, the KEA assumption plays a critical role for provable deniability of authentication and
key-exchange (e.g., [19, 37, 20]).
Simultaneous exponentiation. Given two generators g1, g2 ∈ G and two values x, y ∈ Zq,
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the computation of gx1g
y
2 amounts to about 1.3 exponentiations by the simultaneous exponentiation
techniques [43, 30, 22].
3 Design of (s)OAKE: Motivation, Discussion and Specification
We consider an adversarial setting, where polynomially many instances (i.e., sessions) of a Diffie-Hellman
protocol 〈Aˆ, Bˆ〉 are run concurrently over an asynchronous network like the Internet. To distinguish
concurrent sessions, each session run at the side of an uncorrupted player is labeled by a tag, which is the
concatenation, in the order of session initiator and then session responder, of players’ identities/public-
keys and DH-components available from the session transcript. A session-tag is complete if it consists
of a complete set of all these components.
In this work, we study the mechanisms, in the random oracle (RO) model, for non-malleably and
jointly proving the knowledge of both b and y w.r.t. a challenge DH-component X between the prover
Bˆ (of public-key B = gb and DH-component Y = gy) and the verifier Aˆ (who presents the challenge
DH-component X = gx), where b, y, x ∈ Z∗q . For presentation simplicity, such protocol mechanism is
referred to as JPOK(b, y). Moreover, we look for solutions of JPOK(b,y) such that JPOK(b,y) can be
efficiently computed with one single exponentiation by the knowledge prover. Note that the tag for a
complete session of JPOK(b,y) is (Aˆ, Bˆ, B,X, Y ). The possibility of JPOK(b,y) without ROs (based
upon pairings) is left to be studied in a subsequent separate paper. Throughout this work, we use a
hash function h, which is modeled as a random oracle, and we denote by the output length, i.e., l, of h
as the security parameter.
One naive solution of JPOK(b,y) is just to set JPOK(b,y) = X
b · Xy = Xb+y. But, such a naive
solution is totally insecure, for example, an adversary A can easily impersonate the prover Bˆ and pre-
determine JPOK(b,y) to be 1G, by setting Y = B
−1. The underlying reason is: A can malleate B and
Y into Xy+b by maliciously correlating the values of y and b, but actually without knowing either of
them. A further remedy of this situation is to mask the exponents b and y by some random values.
In this case, the proof is denoted as JPOK(b,y) = X
db+ey, where d and e are random values (e.g.,
d = h(X, Bˆ) and e = h(Y, Aˆ) as in HMQV in the RO model). The intuition with this remedy solution
is: since d and e are random values, db and ey are also random (even if the values Y and B, and thus
the values of y and b, may be maliciously correlated). This intuition however turns out also to be wrong
in general. With the values d = h(B, Aˆ) and e = h(X, Bˆ) as an illustrative example, after receiving X
an adversary A can generate and send Y = B−d/e, and in this case JPOK(b,y) = X
db+ey = 1G. This
shows that masking b and y by random values is also not sufficient for ensuring the non-malleability of
JPOK(b,y). The key point here is that the values db and ey are not necessarily independent, and thus
a malicious prover can still make the values db and ey correlated. This line of investigations bring us
to the following two candidates for non-malleable joint proof-of-knowledge (NMJPOK) of both b and y
w.r.t. X, under the preference of on-line efficiency and minimal use of RO. More details are referred to
Appendix B.
• NMJPOK: NMJPOK(b,y) = X
db+ey, where d = h(B,X) and e = h(X,Y );
• Single-hash NMJPOK (sNMJPOK): sNMJPOK(b,y) = X
db+ey, where d = 1 and e = h(B,X, Y ).
Below, we provide some informal justifications of NMJPOK and sNMJPOK, by avoiding intro-
ducing and employing some cumbersome terminologies for easier interpretation. Formal treatments are
referred to Appendix B. Informally speaking, the underlying rationale of NMJPOK(b,y) is: given a
random challenge X, no matter how a malicious Bˆ chooses the values Y = gy and B = gb (where y and
b can be arbitrarily correlated), it actually has no control over the values db and ey in the RO model
(by the birthday paradox). That is, it is infeasible for a malicious Bˆ to set db (resp., ey) to some pre-
determined value, which may be determined by ey (resp., db) via some predetermined polynomial-time
computable relation R, with non-negligible probability in the RO model in order to make the values db
and ey correlated. Alternatively speaking, given a random challenge X, it is infeasible for a malicious
Bˆ to output B = gb and Y = gy such that the values db and ey satisfy some predetermined relation R
with non-negligible probability in the RO model.
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Aˆ, A, X = gx
Bˆ, B, Y = gy
Aˆ Bˆ
(H)MQV: KAˆ = (Y B
e)x+da, KBˆ = (XA
d)y+eb, K = HK(KAˆ) = HK(Bˆ)
KAˆ = B
xdY ac+xe, KBˆ = A
ycXbd+ye, K = HK(KAˆ) = HK(K ˆ)
PKBˆ : B = g
b
SKBˆ : b
PKAˆ : A = g
a
SKAˆ : a
MQV: d = 2l + (X mod 2l), e = 2l + (Y mod 2l), l = |q|/2
HMQV: d = h(X, Bˆ), e = h(Y, Aˆ), l = |q|/2
c = d = 1, e = h(Aˆ, A, Bˆ, B,X, Y ), l ≈ |q|
c = h(Aˆ, A, Y ), d = h(Bˆ, B, X), e = h(X,Y ), l ≈ |q|
1
B
V2$.(
(s)OAKE:
OAKE:
sOAKE:
Figure 1: Specifications of (H)MQV and (s)OAKE
The situation with sNMJPOK(b,y) is a bit different. Though as in NMJPOK(b,y), the malicious Bˆ
is infeasible to set ey to a predetermined value, Bˆ can always set the value db = b at its wish as d = 1 for
sNMJPOK(b,y). But, Bˆ is still infeasible to set the value b correlated to ey = h(B,X, Y )y, particularly
because the value B is put into the input of e. Specifically, for any value B = gb set by Bˆ, with the
goal of making b and ey correlated, the probability that the values ey = h(B,X, Y )y and b satisfy
some predetermined (polynomial-time computable) relation R is negligible in the RO model (by the
birthday paradox). In particular, the probability that Pr[b = f(ey)] or Pr[f(b) = ey], where f is some
predetermined polynomial-time computable function (that is in turn determined by the predetermined
relation R), is negligible in the RO model, no matter how the malicious Bˆ does.
Note that NMJPOK(b,y) = X
db+ey = (BdY e)x, where d = h(B,X) and e = h(X,Y ), actually can
be used to demonstrate the knowledge of x. The key observation now is: in order for Aˆ to additionally
prove the knowledge of its secret-key a, we can multiply Xdb+ey by another POK Y ca for c = h(A,Y ).
This yields KAˆ = B
dxY ca+ex = AcyXdb+ey = KBˆ , where KAˆ (resp., KBˆ) is computed by Aˆ (resp.,
Bˆ) respectively. As we aim for secure DHKE protocols in concurrent settings like the Internet, we
let the values KAˆ and KBˆ commit to the complete session tag by putting users’ identities into the
inputs of d and/or e, which particularly ensures the “key-control” property of [40] for DHKE. All the
observations are boiled down to the OAKE protocol, which is depicted in Figure 1. The version derived
from sNMJPOK, referred to as single-hash OAKE (sOAKE), is also depicted in Figure 1. Note that the
output length of h, i.e., l, is set to be |q|/2 in (H)MQV, but approximately |q| in OAKE and sOAKE
protocols. In particular, with the (s)OAKE protocol family, h and HK (that is used for deriving the
session-key K) can be identical. Also note that, for (s)OAKE, Aˆ (resp., Bˆ) can offline pre-compute
X and Bdx (resp., Y and Acy). Some (s)OAKE variants are given in Appendix C. We also highlight
another property, called tag-based self-seal (TBSS), of (s)OAKE in the RO model: given any complete
session tag (Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y ) and any α ∈ G \ 1G, Pr[KAˆ = KBˆ = α] ≤
1
2l−1
, where the probability is
taken over the choice of the random function of h (see more discussions on TBSS in Appendix B).
Notes on subgroup tests in (s)OAKE. The basic technique to check the DH-component, e.g.
X, is in G is to verify Xq = 1G (and X ∈ G
′ \ 1G) that needs performing one modular exponentiation.
But, if the cofactor t is small, e.g., G′ = Z∗N such that N = 2q + 1 or G is the subgroup of an elliptic
curve over a finite field (in this case the cofactor t is usually a small constant), the subgroup test of
X can be essentially reduced to: (1) check X ∈ G′; (2). Xt 6= 1G. In general, checking X ∈ G
′ and
Xt 6= 1G guarantees that X is not in a (small) subgroup of G
′ with the order that is a factor of t, but it
does not fully guarantee X ∈ G (e.g., considering that X = −gx). This leads to the following (s)OAKE
variant with embedded subgroup tests, in which the values KAˆ,KBˆ are set to be: KAˆ = B
dxtY cat+ext
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and KBˆ = A
cytXdbt+eyt. The subgroup test is performed as follows: each player first verifies that its
peer’s DH-component is in G′, and then acts in accordance with one of the following two cases.
Case-1. If Bdxt and Y cat+ext (resp., Acyt and Xdbt+eyt) are computed separately, particularly when
Bdxt (resp., Acyt) is offline pre-computed by Aˆ (resp., Bˆ), Aˆ (resp., Bˆ) checks that Y cat+ext 6= 1G
(resp., Xdbt+eyt 6= 1G);
Case-2. In case of no separate computation, Aˆ (resp., Bˆ) verifies KAˆ 6= 1G (resp., KBˆ 6= 1G). Note that
the checking of KAˆ 6= 1G and KBˆ 6= 1G, as done in MQV, does not fully guarantee X
t 6= 1G or
Y t 6= 1G, but it still provides reasonable assurance in the elliptic curve setting as clarified above.
We remark that the embedded subgroup test in Case-1, well supported by (s)OAKE, provides stronger
security guarantee than that in Case-2 as done in (H)MQV. Note that (H)MQV cannot offline pre-
compute the values Be and Ad to ease the more robust Case-1 embedded subgroup test. We note that
the damage caused by ignoring the subgroup test of peer’s DH-component (but still with the supergroup
G′ membership check) can be much relieved (and even waived), if the ephemeral private values generated
within the protocol run are well-protected. More notes on the subgroup test, and on the ephemeral
private values that can be exposed to adversary, are referred to Appendix D.
4 Advantageous Features of (s)OAKE
Efficiency advantages. The online computational complexity of (s)OAKE can remarkably be only
1 exponentiation at each player side (with embedded subgroup test), which is optimal for DHKE.
Specifically, the value Bdxt (resp., Acyt) can be offline pre-computed by Aˆ (resp., Bˆ). In comparison,
(H)MQV cannot offline pre-compute the values Be and Ad to improve online efficiency, and thus the
online efficiency of (H)MQV is about 1.3 exponentiations.
The total computational complexity of (s)OAKE is essentially the same as that of (H)MQV, with
sOAKE being still slightly more efficient than HMQV. In particular, by the simultaneous exponentiation
techniques [43, 30, 22], each player in (H)MQV and (s)OAKE performs about 1.3 exponentiations
in computing KAˆ or KBˆ . But, the computation of KAˆ (resp., KBˆ) of HMQV is still slightly more
inefficient than that of sOAKE with a single hash. For example, to compute KAˆ, besides the same
other operations needed for simultaneous exponentiations, HMQV (resp., sOAKE) needs to compute
{d, e, x + da, e(x + da)} (resp., only {e, a+ xe}).
On the same subgroup order q, (s)OAKE ensures more robust resistance to collision attacks against
the underlying hash function h than HMQV, as the output length of h, i.e., l, is set to be |q|/2 for
HMQV but |q| for (s)OAKE. To strengthen its security, some standards specify larger subgroups (e.g.,
|q| = 255 in [50]) to use for HMQV. However, in memory-restricted environments (like smart-cards or
other portable electronic tokens), subgroup size is an influential parameter in favor of a given algorithmic
solution.
Reasonable deniability. For key-exchange protocols, both security and privacy are desired, which
would also have been being one of the major criteria underlying the evolution of a list of important
industrial standards of DHKE (e.g., Internet key-exchange). Among privacy concerns, deniability is an
essential privacy property, and has always been a central concern in personal and business communica-
tions, with off-the-record communication serving as an essential social and political tool [19, 20]. The
reader is referred to [19, 20] for a list of scenarios where deniability is desirable. (Needless to say, there
are special applications where non-repudiable communication is essential, but this is not the case for
most of our nowaday communications over Internet [19, 20] where deniable authentication is much more
desirable than non-repudiable authentication.)
A 2-round implicitly authenticated DHKE protocol is defined to be of reasonable deniability, if the
session-key can be computed merely from the ephemeral DH-exponents without involving any player’s
static secret-key. Note that we cannot count on DHKE with implicit authentication, like (H)MQV and
(s)OAKE, to enjoy full-fledged deniability (zero-knowledge). It is clear that (s)OAKE enjoys reasonable
deniability, as the session-key of (s)OAKE can be computed merely from the DH-exponents x and y,
which is useful to preserve privacy for both protocol players. Note that (H)MQV is not reasonably
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deniable, as the use of the session-key of (H)MQV can be traced back to the group of the two players
particularly in view that the value gab is involved in the session-key computation.
Modular, parallel and post-ID computability. First note that Bdx, Y ca+ex and the explicit
sub-group test Y q by Aˆ (resp., Acy, Xdb+ey and Xq by Bˆ) can be computed in a parallel, modular
and post-ID way, which allows for various trade-offs among security, privacy and efficiency for the
deployment of (s)OAKE in practice. Specifically, the offline pre-computability of Bdx and Acy eases
more efficient explicit subgroup test by computing Y ca+ex and Y q (resp., Xdb+ey andXq) in parallel that
amounts to about 1.2 exponentiations. Also, as clarified, offline pre-computability of Acy (resp., Bdx)
allows the above more robust Case-1 embedded subgroup test of Xdbt+ext (resp., Y cat+ext). Observe
that, for OAKE, Y ca+ex (resp., Xdb+ey) can be computed before learning peer’s identity and public-
key information. Such a post-ID computability, besides reasonable deniability, is useful for privacy
preserving [15]. (H)MQV does not support such offline pre-computability and post-ID computability.
Ease deployment with lower-power devices. As we shall see in Section 4.2 and Appendix
H.1, (s)OAKE (with offline pre-computation to an almost maximum extent) well supports the public
computation model [39] (while (H)MQV does not), which is desirable for deploying KE protocols with
authentication devices of limited computational ability in hostile computing environments. (s)OAKE
allows smaller parameter |q| than HMQV (in resistance to collision attacks against h), which is important
for deployment with memory-restricted devices (like smart-cards or other portable electronic tokens).
Minimal setup. (s)OAKE does not mandate proof of possession/knowledge (POP/K) of secret-key
during public-key registration, while POP/K is now commonly assumed for MQV. POP/K is explicitly
abandoned in HMQV, however as we shall see, there exists a way to maliciously asymmetrically compute
the session-key of HMQV without knowing either static secret-key or ephemeral DH-exponent.
4.1 Security in the CK-Framework
At a high level, the design rationale of (s)OAKE is new, with NMJPOK as the core building tool. The
design of MQV is based on implicit signatures [44]. The design of HMQV is based on Hashed Dual
challenge-Response (HDR) signatures and Hashed Challenge-Response (HCR) signatures, which are in
turn based on Dual Challenge-Response (DCR) and eXponential Challenge-Response (XCR) signatures.
To further justify the robustness of the NMJPOK-based (s)OAKE protocols, we will show (in Section 5)
that (s)OAKE can also be casted in terms of HDR signatures. Moreover, in comparison with the HDR
signature implied by HMQV (referred to as HMQV-HDR), the HDR signatures implied by (s)OAKE,
referred to as (s)OAKE-HDR/HCR, are both online efficient (i.e., only one online exponentiation) and
strongly secure (by providing stronger secrecy exposure capability to the signature forger and posing
more stringent forgery success condition).
In the CK-framework for a DHKE protocol, a concurrent man-in-the-middle (CMIM) adversary A
controls all the communication channels among concurrent session runs of the KE protocol. In addition,
A is allowed access to secret information via the following three types of queries: (1) state-reveal queries
for ongoing incomplete sessions; (2) session-key queries for completed sessions; (3) corruption queries
upon which all information in the memory of the corrupted parties will be leaked to A. A session
(Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) is called exposed, if it or its matching session (Bˆ, Aˆ, Y,X) suffers from any of these three
queries. The session-key security (SK-security) within the CK-framework is captured as follows: for any
complete session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) adaptively selected by A, referred to as the test session, as long as it is
unexposed, with overwhelming probability it holds that (1) the session-key outputs of the test session
and its matching session are identical; (2) A cannot distinguish the session-key output of the test session
from a random value.
At a first glance, as (s)OAKE is of reasonable deniability (i.e., the session-key can be computed
merely from x and y), (s)OAKE may not be secure in the CK-framework. However, this does not
pose a problem for probable security within the CK-framework, where the test-session is required to
be unexposed. Actually, as we shall see, the provable security of (s)OAKE within the CK-framework
assumes much stronger secrecy exposure than HMQV. If one wants to sacrifice privacy for seemingly
stronger security against exposure of both x and y even for the test-session, one can use the protocol
variant of robust (s)OAKE proposed in Appendix C that is also provably secure in the CK-framework.
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The only difference between robust (s)OAKE and (s)OAKE is that, the values KAˆ and KBˆ in robust
(s)OAKE are set to be: KAˆ = B
a+xdY ac+xe and KBˆ = A
b+ycXbd+ye. But, as discussed in Appendix E,
the security advantage of robust (s)OAKE over (s)OAKE is insignificant, and from our view (s)OAKE
achieves much better balance between security and privacy than the robust (s)OAKE variant.
For provable SK-security within the CK-framework, denote by (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) the test-session, we
show both OAKE and sOAKE (actually their weaker public-key free variants with players’ public-keys
removed from the inputs of c, d, e), with pre-computed and exposed DH-components, DH-exponents and
the values Acy’s and Bdx’s (which renders much stronger secrecy exposure capability to attacker than
HMQV within the CK-framework), are SK-secure in the RO model, under the following assumptions
(with proof details referred to Section 5 and Appendix G):
• The GDH assumption, in case Aˆ 6= Bˆ (which is also the most often case in practice). We note
that, whenever the DH-exponent is generated and exposed during a session-run without offline
pre-computation prior to the session run, OR, there exists an honest player whose public DH-
component for a session is offline pre-computed and exposed prior to the session run (no matter
whether the secret DH-exponent is exposed or not), the security of HMQV is based on both the
GDH assumption and the KEA assumption. That is, for this most often case of Aˆ 6= Bˆ, (s)OAKE
not only allows more powerful secrecy leakage but also is based on weaker assumptions than
HMQV.
• The CDH assumption, in case Aˆ = Bˆ and X = Y .
• The GDH assumption and the KEA assumption, in case Aˆ = Bˆ and X 6= Y (the security of
HMQV is based on the same assumptions in this case).
As stressed in [37], security against exposed DH-exponents is deemed to be the main and prime concern
for any robust DHKE, and security against exposed offline pre-computed values (particularly, the DH-
components) is important to both lower-power devices and to high volume servers [37]. The reason is, as
pointed out in [37], many applications in practice will boost protocol performance by pre-computing and
storing values for later use in the protocol. In this case, however, these stored values are more vulnerable
to leakage, particularly when DHKE is deployed in hostile environments with plagued spyware or virus
and in view of that the offline pre-computed DH-components are much less protected in practice as they
are actually public values to be exchanged in plain.
In addition, (s)OAKE enjoys the following security advantages: (1) tighter security reduction of
sOAKE than HMQV (discussed in Appendix G.2 and G.3); (2) more robust embedded subgroup test
supported by offline pre-computability of Acy and Bdx (as clarified above); Due to space limitation,
more discussions on the security of (s)OAKE vs. (H)MQV are given in Appendix E.
For (s)OAKE, putting public-keys into the input of c, d, e are necessary in order to ensure non-
malleable joint proof-of-knowledge of both (a, x) (resp., (b, y)) by player Aˆ (resp., Bˆ), as clarified with
the development of (s)OAKE based on the underlying building tool of NMJPOK in Section 3 and
Appendix B. But, as we shall see below (by concrete attacks), the SK-security in accordance with the
CK-framework does not ensure joint proof-of-knowledge of (a, x) or (b, y). This is also the reason that we
can prove the SK-security of (s)OAKE w.r.t. the public-key free variant. Next, we show that (s)OAKE
also enjoys essential advantages over (H)MQV beyond the CK-framework.
4.2 Security Beyond the CK-Framework
A new perspective to DHKE: exponent-dependent attacks (EDA) on (H)MQV, and the
introduction of computational fairness. In this work, we identify EDA attacks against (H)MQV,
which causes computational unfairness between malicious users and honest users in the sense that an
adversary can compute the shared DH-secret with an honest player in an asymmetric way. We then
discuss the implications and damages caused by EDA attacks, and then introduce a new security notion
called “computational fairness” for authenticated DHKE protocols.
Given a value X ∈ G for which the malicious player Aˆ (e.g., a client) does not necessarily know
the discrete logarithm of X, Aˆ computes d and sets A = X−d
−1
· gt where t ∈ Zq and d = h(X, Bˆ) for
7
HMQV or d = 2l + (X mod 2l) for MQV. Note that XAd = X(X−d
−1
· gt)d = XX−1gtd = gtd, and
the shared DH-secret now is KAˆ = (XA
d)y+eb = gtdygtdeb = Y tdBtde. We call such an attack exponent
dependent attack. If A sets t = 0 then the shared DH-secret KAˆ is always 1G. If A sets t = d
−1, then
KAˆ = Y B
e. For all these two specific cases, the value KAˆ can be publicly computed (without involving
any secret values). In any case, the computational complexity in computing the shared DH-secret
by the malicious Aˆ is much lesser than that by its peer Bˆ, which clearly indicates some unfairness. In
general, the malicious Aˆ can honestly generate its public-key A = ga and compute the session-keys, thus
explicitly requiring POP/K of secret-key during public-key registration and explicit key-confirmation
and mutual authentication (as required by the 3-round (H)MQV) do not prevent the above attacks. As
there are many choices of the value t by the adversary in different sessions, explicitly checking whether
the shared DH-secret is Y Be also does not work. The above attacks can also be trivially modified
(actually simplified) to be against the one-round HMQV variant. We stress that such attacks do not
violate the security analysis of HMQV in [37], as they are beyond the CK framework.
We note that MQV (with embedded subgroup membership test of peer’s DH-component) explicitly
checks the shared DH-secret is not 1G, and thus the attack with t = 0 does not work against MQV.
But, for (H)MQV with explicit subgroup tests of peer’s public-key and DH-component, whether still
checking the shared DH-secret is 1G is however unspecified. In particular, the basic version of HMQV
[37] does not check whether the shared DH-secret is 1G or not, and POP/K of secret-keys is explicitly
abandoned in HMQV. We also note the version of HMQV proposed in [38] does check and ensure the
shared DH-secret is not 1G. But, (H)MQV does not resist the above attacks with t 6= 0.
Besides asymmetric computation, such drawbacks also allow more effective DoS attacks. Though an
adversary can send arbitrary messages to an honest party (say, player Bˆ in the above attacks) to issue
DoS attacks, which however can be easily detected by the authentication mechanism of (the 3-round
version of) (H)MQV. But, with our above attacks, the honest player Bˆ is hard to distinguish and detect
an attack from an honest execution of (H)MQV.
This motivates us to introduce a new notion for DHKE, called session-key computational fairness.
Roughly speaking, we say that a DHKE protocol enjoys session-key computational fairness, if the
session-key computation (for any successfully finished session between a possibly malicious player and
an honest player) involves the same number of non-malleably independent dominant-operation values
for both the malicious player and the honest player. Here, dominant operation is specific to protocols,
and for (s)OAKE and (H)MQV, the dominant operation is defined just to be modular exponentiation.
Informally speaking, a set of dominant-operation values {V I1 , · · · , V
I
m} for m ≥ 2 are non-malleably
independent, if any polynomial-time malicious player I ∈ {Aˆ, Bˆ} cannot make these values correlated
under any predetermined polynomial-time computable relation (no matter how the malicious player
does). More formally, for any complete session-tag Tag, we say that a set of dominant-operation
values {V I1 , · · · , V
I
m} (w.r.t. Tag) are non-malleably independent, if they are indistinguishable from
independent random values {U1, · · · , Um} or {U1, · · · , Uj−1, V
I
j , Uj+1, · · · , Um} for at most one j, 1 ≤
j ≤ m. We then show that (s)OAKE enjoys session-key computational fairness, while (H)MQV does
not by the above concrete EDA attacks. We also propose some HMQV variants, just in the spirit of
(s)OAKE and NMJPOK, to prevent our EDA attacks. The key point is to put A (resp., B) into the
input of d (resp., e). Unfortunately, we failed in providing provable security of these fixing approaches in
the CK-framework. In particular, we observed that it is hard to extend the security proof of HMQV [37]
to any of the proposed fixing solutions (indeed, HMQV was very carefully designed to enjoy provable
security in the CK-framework). Besides lacking provable security in the CK-framework, many other
advantageous features enjoyed by (s)OAKE are also lost with these fixing solutions. To the best of our
knowledge, we do not know how to achieve, besides the newly developed (s)OAKE family, implicitly
authenticated DHKE protocols that enjoy all the following properties: (1) provable security in the CK-
framework; (2) online optimal (i.e., only one exponentiation) efficiency and/or reasonable deniability;
(3) session-key computational fairness. The surrounding issues are quite subtle and tricky, and indeed
(s)OAKE was very carefully designed to achieve all these features (and much more as clarified above).
Due to space limitation, the reader is referred to Appendix F for more details.
On supporting the public computation model [39]. The work [39] proposed the public
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computation model for KE protocols, where an entity (performing a run of KE-protocol) is split into
two parts: a trusted authentication device (which enforces the confidentiality of the authentication
data), and an untrusted computing device (in which some computing operations are publicly carried
out). This allows to use an authentication device with little computing power, and to make computing
devices independent from users [39]. Some concrete applications suggested in [39] are: (1) Mobile
phones include smart cards which store the user authentication data; the handsets themselves are the
computing devices. (2) PCs (corresponding to the computing device) equipped with a crypto token
(corresponding to the authentication device) have a lot more computing power than the token itself,
but may be plagued by spyware or virus. (H)MQV does not well support deployment with such public
computation as shown in [39], while (s)OAKE well supports deployment in this model (see details
in Appendix H). Specifically, the natural split of authentication computation and public computation
for (s)OAKE is as follows, with the computation of Bˆ as an example: (1) The authentication device
generates (y, Y ) and possibly Acy (in case the authentication device has learnt the peer identity Aˆ), and
then forwards Y and possibly Acy to the computation device; (2) After getting X from the computation
device, the authentication device computes s = db+ ey, and then forwards s to the computation device;
(3) After getting s from the authentication device, the computation device computes KBˆ = A
cyXs and
the session-key, and then communicate with Aˆ with the session-key. Note that y, Y, c, d,Acy , db can be
offline pre-computed by the authentication device, and the authentication device can only online compute
ey and Xs.
More discussions of the security of (s)OAKE beyond CK-framework are referred to Appendix H. The
security of (s)OAKE, in the CK-framework and beyond, further justifies the soundness and robustness
of the design rational and building tools of (s)OAKE.
5 Casting (s)OAKE in Terms of HDR Signatures
Informally speaking, to distinguish the session-key output of the unexposed test-session from a random
value, an efficient adversary A only has two strategies in the RO model:
Key-replication attack. A succeeds in forcing the establishment of a session (other than the test-
session or its matching session) that has the same session-key output as the test-session. In this
case, A can learn the test-session key by simply querying the session to get the same key.
Forging attack. At some point in its run, A queries the RO HK with the value KAˆ or KBˆ . This
implies that A succeeds in outputting the value KAˆ or KBˆ .
At high level, the possibility of key-replication attack against (s)OAKE is ruled out unconditionally
in the RO model by the NMJPOK and TBSS properties of (s)OAKE, which actually holds also for
the public-key free variant of (s)OAKE (as matching sessions are defined without taking public-keys
into account in the CK-framework). Below, we focus on ruling out the possibility of forging attack.
Intuitively, by the NMJPOK property of (s)OAKE, an attacker can compute the DH-secret KAˆ or
KBˆ of the test-session only if it does indeed “know” both the corresponding static secret-key and the
ephemeral DH-exponent, which then violates the discrete logarithm assumption. But, turning this
intuition into a formal proof needs introducing some non-standard non-black-box assumptions (though
it much simplifies the security analysis), which may not be very favorable and is left to a subsequent
separate work (for analyzing (s)OAKE in more security models). In this work, we mainly focus on the
black-box analysis of (s)OAKE in the CK-framework. In the rest, we show the forging attack can still
be ruled out in a black-box manner, by casting (s)OAKE in terms of online-efficient and strongly secure
HDR signatures. Full details (of this section) are given in Appendix G.
Informally speaking, a HDR signature scheme is an interactive signature scheme between two parties
in the public-key model, with the dual roles of signer and challenger.
Definition 5.1 ((s)OAKE-HDR signatures) Let Aˆ,Bˆ be two parties with public-keys A = ga, B =
gb, respectively. Let mAˆ, mBˆ be two messages. The (s)OAKE-HDR signatures of Bˆ on messages
(mAˆ,mBˆ , Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y ) are defined as a vector of values (the signatures of Aˆ are defined similarly):
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1. Forger F is given values B, X0, where B,X0 ∈R G.
2. F is given access to a signing oracle Bˆ (of public-key B = gb and secret-key b).
3. Each signature query from F to Bˆ consists of the following interactions:
(a) F presents Bˆ with messages (Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
). Here, Zˆ can be any (even corrupted) party
chosen by F , and Z = gz ∈ G \ 1G is the public-key of Zˆ. Note that F may not necessarily
know the corresponding secret-key z of Zˆ.
(b) Bˆ generates y ∈R Z∗q and Y = g
y, and computes Zcy, where c = h(m
Zˆ
, Zˆ, Z, Y ) for
OAKE-HDR or c = 1 for sOAKE-HDR. Then, Bˆ responds with (y, Y = gy, Zcy) to
F (which captures the powerful exposure capability to the forger), and stores the vector
(Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, y, Y, Zcy) as an “incomplete session”. Here, (y, Y, Zcy) can be offline pre-
computed by Bˆ, and leaked to F prior to the session involving (y, Y, Zcy).
(c) F presents Bˆ with (Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, Y ), and a challenge X .
(d) Bˆ checks that X ∈ G \ 1G (if not, it aborts) and that (Zˆ, Z,mZˆ ,mBˆ, Y ) is in one
of its incomplete sessions (if not, it ignores). Bˆ then computes r = HK(Z
cyXdb+ey),
where d = h(m
Bˆ
, Bˆ, B,X) and e = h(X,Y ) for OAKE-HDR (resp., d = 1 and e =
(m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, Zˆ, Z, Bˆ, B,X, Y ) for sOAKE-HDR). Bˆ responds (Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, X, Y, r) to F , and
marks the vector (Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, y, Y, Zcy) as a “complete session”, and stores with it the
signature values (Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, X, y, Y, r).
4. F is allowed a polynomial number of adaptive queries to Bˆ in arbitrarily interleaved order.
5. F halts with output “fail” or with a guess in the form of a tuple (Aˆ, A,m1,m0, X0, Y0, r0). F ’s
guess is called a successful forgery if the following two conditions hold:
(a) (Aˆ, A,m1,m0, X0, Y0, r0) is a valid HDR-signature of Bˆ on the messages
(m1,m0, Aˆ, A, Bˆ, B,X0, Y0), where Aˆ is an uncorrupted player of public-key A = g
a,
m1 corresponds to mAˆ (that is an arbitrary message sent by the adversary F impersonating
the signer Bˆ to the honest player Aˆ), and m0 corresponds to mBˆ (that is chosen by the
honest player Aˆ). Note that the value X0 is the one received by F as input.
(b) (Aˆ, A,m1,m0, X0, Y0) did not appear in any one of the responses of Bˆ to F ’s queries.
We say F wins the game, if it outputs a successful forgery (w.r.t. any A = ga not chosen by F).
Figure 2: Forgery game for (strongly secure) (s)OAKE-HDR signatures (with offline pre-computation)
OAKE-HDR. {Aˆ, A,mAˆ,mBˆ,X, Y,HSIG
OAKE
Aˆ,Bˆ
(mAˆ,mBˆ ,X, Y ) = HK(A
ycXbd+ye)}, where X = gx,
Y = gy are chosen by Aˆ, Bˆ respectively as the random challenge and response, x, y ∈R Z
∗
q ,
c = h(mAˆ, Aˆ, A, Y ), d = h(mBˆ , Bˆ, B,X) and e = h(X,Y ).
sOAKE-HDR. {Aˆ, A,mAˆ,mBˆ ,X, Y,HSIG
sOAKE
Aˆ,Bˆ
(mAˆ,mBˆ,X, Y ) = HK(A
ycXbd+ye)}, where c = d =
1, e = h(mAˆ,mBˆ , Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y ).
Definition 5.2 (Strong security of HDR signatures (with off-line pre-computation)) We say
a HDR signature scheme (of Bˆ) is strongly secure, if no polynomial-time machine F can win the game
in Figure 2 with non-negligible probability with respect to any uncorrupted party Aˆ of public-key A = ga
such that the secret-key a was not chosen by the attacker F .
More discussions on the above strong HDR unforgeability security definition and the comparisons
between (s)OAKE-HDR and HMQV-HDR are referred to Appendix G.2. Due to space limitation, we
only present the analysis sketch for OAKE-HDR here, the analysis for sOAKE-HDR is similar and
actually much simpler. See Appendix G for full details.
Theorem 5.1 Under the GDH assumption, (public-key free) OAKE-HDR signatures of Bˆ, with offline
pre-computed and exposable (y, Y,Acy), are strongly secure in the random oracle model, with respect to
any uncorrupted player other than the signer Bˆ itself even if the forger is given the private keys of all
uncorrupted players in the system other than b of Bˆ
Proof (sketch of Theorem 5.1). The efficient solver C (who runs a supposed forger F as a subroutine) for
the GDH problem is presented in Figure 3 (page 12). It is easy to check, with overwhelming probability,
the simulation of O is perfect in the RO model (with details referred to Appendix G).
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Here, we only highlight the analysis of the probability that C aborts at step F3. In the RO
model, except for some negligible probability, F cannot succeed with undefined c0, d0, e0. Also, F
can guess the value r with negligible probability. The only left way for C to abort at step F3 is: r0
is the value r set by C at one of S3.1 steps, where r is supposed to be HK(σ) w.r.t. a stored vector
(Zˆ, Z,mZˆ ,mBˆ ,X, y, Y, Z
cy, r). Recall that for the value r set at step S3.1, C does not know σ (as it
does not know b), and thus in this case both C and F may not make the RO-query HK(σ0) = HK(σ).
In this case, except for some negligible probability, σ0 = σ, i.e., A
c0y0Xd0b+e0y00 = Z
cyXdb+ey, where
c = h(mZˆ , Zˆ, Z, Y ), d = h(mBˆ , Bˆ, B,X), e = h(X,Y ), c0 = h(m1, Aˆ, A, Y0), d0 = h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0), e0 =
h(X0, Y0), and (m0,m1, Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X0, Y0) 6= (mAˆ,mBˆ , Zˆ, Z, Bˆ,B,X, Y ). However, by the NMJPOK
and TBSS properties of OAKE, for any value σ ∈ G \ 1G and any (m1,m0, Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X0, Y0), the
probability Pr[Ac0y0Xd0b+e0y00 = σ] ≤
1
2l−1
, where X0 is the given random element in G \ 1G, Aˆ and
Bˆ are uncorrupted players. This is true, even if the public-key A (resp., B) is removed from c0 (resp.,
d0), as the public-keys A and B are generated by the uncorrupted players Aˆ and Bˆ independently at
random, and X0 is the given random DH-component (not generated by the attacker).
Finally, by applying a slightly extended version of the forking lemma in [53], which is referred to as
divided forking lemma and is presented in Section G.1, we have that, provided that F succeeds with
non-negligible probability in the first run of C, with non-negligible probability F will also succeed in the
repeat experiment C1 or C2. In this case, the output of C is the just correct value of CDH(X0, B). 
Now, we consider the case that the forger F is against the signer Bˆ itself (i.e., Aˆ = Bˆ). We further
distinguish two cases: (1) Y0 6= X0 and (2) Y0 = X0.
Corollary 5.1 Under the GDH assumption, and additionally the KEA assumption, (public-key free)
OAKE-HDR signatures of Bˆ, with offline pre-computed and exposable (y, Y,Acy), are strongly secure
in the random oracle model, with respect to the signer Bˆ itself with Y0 6= X0.
Proof (sketch). The main difference between the proof of Corollary 5.1 and that of Theorem 5.1
is that, here, the forger outputs with non-negligible probability a successful forgery of the form:
(m1,m0, Bˆ, B, Bˆ,B,X0, Y0, r0), i.e., Aˆ = Bˆ, where r0 = HK(σ0), σ0 = B
c0y0Xd0b+e0y00 , c0 = h(m1, Bˆ, B, Y0),
d0 = h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0), e0 = h(X0, Y0). The key point is that, by performing the rewinding experiments,
we cannot directly output the CDH(B,X0), as we do not know the private key b of Bˆ. Recall that, in
this case, the uncorrupted player and the signer are the same.
We modify the algorithm C depicted in Figure 3 as follows: the actions of C remain unchanged until
the rewinding experiments; but C performs the rewinding experiments according to the order of the
RO-queries c0, d0, e0.
d0 posterior to c0, e0. In this case, by rewindingF to the point of making the query d0 = h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0),
and redefines h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0) to be a new independent d
′
0, C will get σ
′
0 = B
c0y0X
d′0b+e0y0
0 . Then,
from σ0 and σ
′
0, C gets that CDH(B,X0) = (σ/σ
′
0)
(d0−d′0)
−1
. Note that, in this case, C does not
rely on the KEA assumption for breaking the CDH assumption (but still with the DDH-oracle).
c0 posterior to d0, e0. In this case, by rewindingF to the point of making the query c0 = h(m1, Bˆ, B, Y0),
and redefines h(m1, Bˆ, B, Y0) to be a new independent c
′
0, C will get σ
′
0 = B
c′0y0Xd0b+e0y00 . Then,
from σ0 and σ
′
0, C gets CDH(B,Y0) = B
y0 = (σ/σ′0)
(c0−c′0)
−1
. That is, given B, C can output
(Y0, B
y0). By the KEA assumption, it implies that F knows y0 (which can be derived from the
internal state of F). More formally, there exists an algorithm that, given B and X0 and the ran-
dom coins of C and F , can successfully output y0. Now, with the knowledge of y0, CDH(B,X0)
can be derived from σ0 (or σ
′
0).
e0 posterior to c0, d0. In this case, by rewinding F to the point of making the query e0 = h(X0, Y0),
and redefines h(X0, Y0) to be a new independent e
′
0, C will get σ
′
0 = B
c0y0X
d0b+e′0y0
0 . Then, from
σ0 and σ
′
0, C gets CDH(X0, Y0) = X
y0
0 = (σ/σ
′
0)
(e0−e′0)
−1
. Then, by the KEA assumption, the
knowledge of y0 can be derived, with which CDH(X0, B) can then be computed 
Corollary 5.2 Under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, (public-key free) OAKE-
HDR signatures of Bˆ, with offline pre-computed and exposable (y, Y,Acy), are strongly secure in the
random oracle model, with respect to the signer Bˆ itself with Y0 = X0.
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Building the CDH solver C from the OAKE-HDR forger F
Setup: The inputs to C are random elements U = gu, V = gv in G, and its goal is to compute CDH(U, V ) = guv with
oracle access to a DDH oracle O. To this end, C sets B = V and X0 = U , and sets the public-keys and secret-keys for
all other uncorrupted players in the system. C runs the forger F on input (B,X0) against the signer Bˆ of public-key
B. C provides F with a random tape, and provides the secret-keys of all uncorrupted players other than the signer Bˆ
itself (the attacker F may register arbitrary public-keys for corrupted players, based on the public-keys and secret-keys
of uncorrupted players).
Signature query simulation: Each time F queries Bˆ for a signature on values (Zˆ, Z,mBˆ,mAˆ), C answers the query
for Bˆ as follows (note that C does not know b):
S1. C generates y ∈R Z
∗
q , Y = g
y and Zcy , where c = h(mZˆ , Zˆ, Z, Y ) (that may be pre-defined, otherwise C defines c
with the RO h). Actually, (y, Y, Zcy) can be pre-computed by C and leaked to F prior to the session. Then, C
responds (y, Y = gy, Zcy) to F , and stores the vector (Zˆ, Z,mZˆ ,mBˆ, y, Y,A
cy) as an “incomplete session”.
S2. F presents C with (Zˆ, Z,mZˆ ,mBˆ , Y ), and a challenge X.
S3. Bˆ checks that X ∈ G \ 1G (if not, it aborts) and that (Zˆ, Z,mZˆ , mBˆ, Y ) is in one of its incomplete sessions (if not,
it ignores the query). Then, C checks for every value σ ∈ G \ 1G previously used by F as input to HK whether
σ = ZcyXbd+ye, where d = h(mBˆ, Bˆ, B,X) and e = h(X, Y ) (in case d, e undefined, C defines them with h): it
does so using the DDH-oracle O, specifically, by checking whether CDH(X,B) = (σ/ZcyXye)d
−1
. If the answer
is positive, then C sets r to the already determined value of HK(σ).
S3.1. In any other cases, r is set to be a random value in {0, 1}k, where k is the output length of HK . Note that,
in this case, C does not know σ = ZcyXdb+ey , as it does not know b, which also implies that C does not
make (actually realize) the RO-query HK(σ) even if the value σ has been well-defined and known to F .
Finally, C marks the vector (Zˆ, Z,mZˆ ,mBˆ , X, y, Y, Z
cy) as a “complete session”, stores
(Zˆ, Z,mZˆ ,mBˆ , X, y, Y, Z
cy , r) and responds (Zˆ, Z,mZˆ ,mBˆ, X, Y, r) to F .
RO queries: C provides random answers to queries to the random oracles h and HK (made by F), under the limitation
that if the same RO-query is presented more than once, C answers it with the same response as in the first time. But, for
each new query σ toHK , C checks whether σ = Z
cyXdb+ey for any one of the stored vectors (Zˆ, Z,mZˆ ,mBˆ, X, y, Y, Z
cy , r)
(as before, this check is done using the DDH-oracle). If equality holds then the corresponding r is returned as the
predefined HK(σ), otherwise a random r is returned.
Upon F’s termination. When F halts, C checks whether the following conditions hold:
F1. F outputs a valid HDR-signature (Aˆ, A,m1,m0, X0, Y0, r0), where Aˆ 6= Bˆ is an uncorrupted player. In particular,
it implies that r0 should be HK(σ0), where σ0 = A
y0c0Xbd0+y0e00 , Y0 = g
y0 (chosen by F), c0 = h(m1, Aˆ, A, Y0),
d0 = h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0) and e0 = h(X0, Y0).
F2. (Aˆ, A,m1,m0, X0, Y0) did not appear in any of the above responses of the simulated OAKE-HDR signatures.
F3. The values c0 = h(m1, Aˆ, A, Y0), d0 = h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0) and e0 = h(X0, Y0) were queried from the RO h, and the
value HK(σ0) was queried from HK being posterior to the queries c0, d0, e0. Otherwise, C aborts.
If these three conditions hold, C proceeds to the “repeat experiments” below, else it aborts.
The repeat experiments. C runs F again for a second time, under the same input (B,X0) and using the same coins
for F . There are two cases according to the order of the queries of h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0) and h(X0, Y0)
C1. h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0) posterior to h(X0, Y0): C rewinds F to the point of making the RO query h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0),
responds back a new independent value d′0 ∈R {0, 1}
l. All subsequent actions of C (including random an-
swers to subsequent RO queries) are independent of the first run. If in this repeated run F outputs a
successful forgery (Aˆ′, A′,m′1,m0, X0, Y0, r
′
0) satisfying the conditions F1-F3 (otherwise, C aborts), which par-
ticularly implies that r′0 = HK(σ
′
0), σ
′
0 = A
′y0c
′
0X
bd′
0
+y0e0
0 , C computes CDH(U, V ) = CDH(X0, B) =
[(σ0/Y
ac0
0 )/(σ
′
0/Y
a′c′
0
0 )]
(d0−d
′
0
)−1 , where a and a′ are the private keys of the uncorrupted Aˆ and Aˆ′ (different
from Bˆ, which are assumed to be known to C). Note that (Aˆ′, A′,m′1) need not necessarily to equal (Aˆ, A,m1).
C2. h(X0, Y0) posterior to h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0): C rewinds F to the point of making the RO query h(X0, Y0), re-
sponds back a new independent value e′0 ∈R {0, 1}
l. If in this repeated run F outputs a successful forgery
(Aˆ′, A′,m′1, m0, X0, Y0, r
′
0) satisfying the conditions F1-F3 (otherwise, C aborts), which particularly implies that
r′0 = HK(σ
′
0), σ
′
0 = A
′y0c
′
0X
bd0+y0e
′
0
0 , C computes X
y0
0 = ((σ0/Y
ac0
0 )/(σ
′
0/Y
a′c′
0
0 ))
(e0−e
′
0
), and then CDH(U, V ) =
CDH(X0, B) = (σ0/((X
y0
0 )
e0 · Y ac00 ))
d
−1
0 .
Figure 3: Reduction from GDH to OAKE-HDR forgeries
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After establishing the strong unforgeability security of (s)OAKE-HDR, similar to the analysis of
HMQV, the analysis of (s)OAKE within the CK-framework is quite straightforward and less interesting.
In particular, the special structure of sOAKE-HDR also much simplifies the security analysis of sOAKE
by only using the standard forking lemma [53], and tightens the security reductions. Full details are
referred to Appendix G.3.
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A Variants of (H)MQV
Three-round HMQV (resp., MQV) adds key confirmation as follows: letKm = HK(KAˆ, 0) = HK(KBˆ , 0),
Bˆ uses Km as the MAC key to authenticate 0 (resp., (2, Bˆ, Aˆ, Y,X)) in the second-round of HMQV
(resp., MQV); and Aˆ uses Km to authenticate 1 (resp., (3, Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y )) in an additional third-round of
HMQV (resp., MQV). The session-key is set to be K = HK(KAˆ, 1) = HK(KBˆ , 1).
In one-round HMQV, only Aˆ sends X, and the session-key is derived as follows: KAˆ = B
x+da,
KBˆ = (XA
d)b, d = h(X, Aˆ, Bˆ), K = HK(KAˆ) = HK(KBˆ).
B NMJPOK: Motivation, Formulation, and Implementations
We consider an adversarial setting, where polynomially many instances (i.e., sessions) of a Diffie-Hellman
protocol 〈Aˆ, Bˆ〉 are run concurrently over an asynchronous network like the Internet. To distinguish
concurrent sessions, each session run at the side of an uncorrupted player is labeled by a tag, which is the
concatenation, in the order of session initiator and then session responder, of players’ identities/public-
keys and DH-components available from the session transcript. A session-tag is complete if it consists
of a complete set of all these components.
In this work, we study the mechanisms for non-malleably and jointly proving the knowledge of
both b and y w.r.t. a challenge DH-component X between the prover Bˆ (of public-key B = gb and
DH-component Y = gy) and the verifier Aˆ (who presents the challenge DH-component X = gx), where
b, y, x ∈ Z∗q . In particular, we investigate joint proof-of-knowledge (JPOK) of the type JPOK(b,y) =
fh0 (X
b, aux0) · f
h
1 (X
y, aux1) in the random oracle model, where f
h
0 and f
h
1 are some functions from
{0, 1}∗ to G \ 1G with oracle access to an RO h : {0, 1}
∗ → {0, 1}l , aux0 and aux1 are some public
values. Moreover, we look for solutions of JPOK(b,y) such that JPOK(b,y) can be efficiently computed
with one single exponentiation by the knowledge prover. Note that the tag for a complete session of
JPOK(b,y) is (Aˆ, Bˆ, B,X, Y ). The possibility of NMJPOK without ROs (based upon pairings) is left
to be studied in a subsequent separate paper. In the rest of this paper, we denote by the output length,
i.e., l, of h as the security parameter.
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One naive solution of JPOK(b,y) is just to set JPOK(b,y) = X
b · Xy = Xb+y. But, such a naive
solution is totally insecure, for example, an adversary A can easily impersonate the prover Bˆ and
pre-determine the value of JPOK(b,y) to be 1G, by simply setting Y = B
−1. The underlying reason
is: A can malleate B and Y into Xy+b by maliciously correlating the values of y and b, but actually
without knowing either of them. A further remedy of this situation is to mask the exponents b and
y by some random values. In this case, the proof is denoted as JPOK(b,y) = X
db+ey, where d and e
are random values (e.g., d = h(X, Bˆ) and e = h(Y, Aˆ) as in HMQV in the RO model). The intuition
with this remedy solution is: since d and e are random values, the values of db and ey are also random
(even if the values Y and B, and thus the values of y and b, may be maliciously correlated). This
intuition however turns out also to be wrong. With the values d = h(B, Aˆ) and e = h(X, Bˆ) as an
illustrative example, after receiving X an adversary A can generate and send Y = B−d/e, and in this
case JPOK(b,y) = X
db+ey = 1G. This shows that masking b and y by random values is also not sufficient
for ensuring the non-malleability of JPOK(b,y). The key point here is that the values db and ey are
not necessarily independent. A series of careful investigations bring us to the following principles for
proving DH knowledges non-malleably and jointly:
Inside Computational Independence. Denote S0 = {X,B}, Z0 = CDH(X,B) = g
xb, F0 =
fh0 (Z0, aux0), S1 = {X,Y }, Z1 = CDH(X,Y ) and F1 = f
h
1 (Z1, aux1). The key principle is: the inside
multiplied components F0 and F1 of JPOK(b,y) should be computationally independent, no matter
how a malicious knowledge prover Bˆ (of public-key B = gb ∈ G) does. That is, the adversarial
attempts at Zδ for any δ ∈ {0, 1} should be essentially sealed (i.e., localized) to Fδ, and are isolated
(i.e., “independent”) from the adversarial attempts at Z1−δ. This essentially ensures that no matter
how the possibly malicious knowledge-prover Bˆ does, to compute JPOK(b,y) Bˆ has to compute two
“independent” DH-secrets F0 and F1 w.r.t. the fresh challenge X, which implies that Bˆ does indeed
“know” both b and y.
Definition B.1 (computational independence) We formulate two types of “computational inde-
pendence” w.r.t. JPOK(b,y):
(1) Self-sealed computational independence. Given arbitrary values (α, β) ∈ (G\1G)
2, no matter how
a malicious Bˆ does, both Pr[F0 = α] and Pr[F1 = β] are negligible.
(2) Committed computational independence. There exists δ ∈ {0, 1} such that for any α ∈ G \ 1G
Pr[Fδ = α] is negligible, no matter how a malicious Bˆ does. This captures the independence of Fδ on
F1−δ, i.e., the infeasibility of adversarial attempts by a malicious prover on setting Fδ to be correlated
to F1−δ; On the other hand, the value F1−δ is committed to Fδ, in the sense that
• S1−δ
⋃
aux1−δ ⊆ auxδ.
• Given (Zδ , auxδ) that determines Fδ = f
h
δ (Zδ, auxδ), no efficient algorithm can provide, with
non-negligible probability, (S′1−δ, aux
′
1−δ) ⊆ aux
′
δ (w.r.t. the same challenge X = S1−δ ∩ S
′
1−δ
from Aˆ and auxδ − aux1−δ = aux
′
δ − aux
′
1−δ) such that S
′
1−δ
⋃
aux′1−δ 6= S1−δ
⋃
aux1−δ but
fhδ (Zδ , auxδ) = f
h
δ (Zδ, aux
′
δ).That is, any adversarial attempt by a malicious prover on setting
F1−δ to be correlated to a given value Fδ, by changing {S1−δ, aux1−δ} into {S
′
1−δ, aux
′
1−δ} w.r.t.
the same random challenge X = S1−δ∩S
′
1−δ and auxδ−aux1−δ = aux
′
δ−aux
′
1−δ (for example, by
simply changing B for the case of δ = 1 or Y for the case of δ = 0), will cause the value Fδ itself
changed that in turn determines and commits to the value F1−δ (while Pr[Fδ = α] is negligible
for any α ∈ G \ 1G). This implies the infeasibility of adversarial attempt on setting F1−δ to be
correlated to Fδ, i.e., the “computational independence” of F1−δ on Fδ.
The probabilities are taken over the random coins used by the malicious Bˆ and the honest Aˆ, and
the choice of the random function h in the RO model.
Informally speaking, the underlying rationale of NMJPOK(b,y) is: given a random challenge X, no
matter how a malicious Bˆ chooses the values Y = gy and B = gb (where the values y and b can be
arbitrarily correlated), it actually has no control over the values db and ey in the RO model. That is, by
the birthday paradox it is infeasible for a malicious Bˆ to set db (resp., ey) to some predetermined value
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with non-negligible probability in the RO model (in order to make the values db and ey correlated).
Alternatively speaking, given a random challenge X, (by the birthday paradox) it is infeasible for a
malicious Bˆ to output B = gb and Y = gy such that the values db and ey satisfy some predetermined
(polynomial-time computable) relation with non-negligible probability in the RO model.
The situation with sNMJPOK(b,y) is a bit different. Though as in NMJPOK(b,y), the malicious
prover Bˆ is infeasible to set ey to a predetermined value, Bˆ can always set the value db = b at its wish
as d = 1 for sNMJPOK(b,y). But, Bˆ is still infeasible to set the value b correlated to ey = h(B,X, Y )y,
particularly because the value B is put into the input of e. Specifically, for any value B (that determines
the value b) set by Bˆ, with the goal of making b and ey correlated, the probability that the values
ey = h(B,X, Y )y and b satisfy some predetermined (polynomial-time computable) relation is negligible
in the RO model (again by the birthday paradox). In particular, the probability that Pr[b = f(ey)]
or Pr[f(b) = ey], where f is some predetermined polynomial-time computable function (that is in turn
determined by some predetermined polynomial-time computable relation), is negligible in the RO model,
no matter how the malicious Bˆ does.
Outside Non-Malleability. As JPOK may be composed with other protocols in practice, another
principle is that the JPOK provided by one party in a session should be bounded to that session, in
the sense that the JPOK should not be malleated into or from other sessions. This is captured by the
following definition, which particularly implies the property of “key control” [40] for DHKE.
Definition B.2 (tag-binding self-seal (TBSS)) For a DH protocol in the RO model, denote by ZTag
the random variable of the shared DH-secret in G (say, JPOK or session-key) determined by a complete
session-tag Tag (taken over the choice of the random function h in the RO model). We say it is tag-
binding self-sealed, if for any α ∈ G \ 1G and any complete Tag, Pr[ZTag = α] ≤ O(
1
2l
) where l is the
security parameter. The probability is taken over the choice of the random function h in the RO model.
The definition of TBSS particularly implies that: given an arbitrary yet complete session-tag Tag,
by the birthday paradox no efficient (polynomial-time) algorithm can, with non-negligible probability,
output a different Tag′ 6= Tag such that ZTag′ and ZTag collide in the sense ZTag′ = ZTag in the RO
model assuming h is a random function. In more detail, by the birthday paradox, the probability that
an efficient algorithm finds two colliding tags (Tag, Tag′) such that ZTag = ZTag′ is bounded by O(
T 2
2l
),
where T = poly(l) is the running time of the algorithm. In a sense, the DH-secret determined by a
complete session-tag is “bounded” to this specific session, and is essentially “independent” of the outside
world composed concurrently with the current session. In particular, the shared DH-secret is random
and unpredictable.
TBSS vs. contributiveness. The work [3] introduced the notion of “contributiveness” property for
password-authenticated group key exchange protocols, which roughly says that the distributions of
session-keys are guaranteed to be random, as long as there are enough honest players in a session. We
noted that our TBSS definition, originally presented in [1, 2] independently of [3], has similar security
guarantee. As we shall see, (H)MQV lacks the TBSS property by the EDA attacks presented in Section
4.2, which implies also that the TBSS property is not captured by the CK-framework.
We say that JPOK(b,y) is a non-malleable joint proof-of-knowledge (NMJPOK), of the knowledges
(b, y) w.r.t. the random DH-component challengeX, if JPOK(b,y) satisfies both the above two principles.
Preferable candidates for NMJPOK. Guided by the above principles, we propose two preferable
solutions for NMJPOK in the RO model:
• Self-sealed JPOK (SSJPOK): SSJPOK(b,y) = X
db+ey, where d = h(Aˆ, Bˆ, B,X) and e = h(X,Y );
Specifically, aux0 = {Aˆ, Bˆ, B,X} and aux1 = {X,Y }, F0 = f
h
0 (X
b, aux0) = X
bh(aux0) and
F1 = f
h
1 (X
y, aux1) = X
yh(aux1). Here, h : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l/0 ⊆ Z∗q is a hash function and l ≈ |q|
(in the unlikely case that h(x) = 0 for some x, the output of h(x) can be defined by default to be
a value in Z∗q − {0, 1}
l).
• Single-hash SSJPOK (sSSJPOK): sSSJPOK(b,y) = X
db+ey, where d = 1 and e = h(Aˆ, Bˆ, B,X, Y );
Specifically, aux0 is empty and aux1 = {Aˆ, Bˆ, B,X, Y }, F0 = f
h
0 (X
b, aux0) = X
b and F1 =
fh1 (X
y , aux1) = X
yh(aux1).
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Needless to say, there are other NMJPOK candidates (e.g., d = h(B,X) and e = h(Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ), or
d = h(Aˆ, Bˆ, B,X, Y ) and e = h(Y,X, Bˆ, Aˆ), etc). But the above explicitly proposed solutions enjoy the
following advantageous properties, which make them more desirable:
• Post-ID, modular and offline computability of SSJPOK. Specifically, as the input of e does not
include Aˆ’s identity and public-key, Aˆ can first send X without revealing its identity information.
In this case, Bˆ can first compute Xey, and thenXdb only after learning Aˆ’s identity and public-key.
Also, without inputting Y into d allows Aˆ to pre-compute Bdx(= Xdb) prior to the protocol run.
• sSSJPOK is preferable because of its offline computability, more efficient computational complexity
and the less use of hash function h.
It is quite straightforward to check that, in the RO model, SSJPOK (resp., sSSJPOK) satisfies
self-sealed (resp., committed) computational independence, and both of them are tag-binding self-
sealed. In more details, for SSJPOK, for any given values (B,Y ) (which determine (b, y)) output by
a malicious prover Bˆ and any value βˆ ∈ Z∗q Pr[db = βˆ] (resp., Pr[ey = βˆ]) is constant: either 0 or
1
2l−1
in the RO model (no matter how a malicious prover Bˆ does). The committed computational
independence of sSSJPOK is from the observation: {X,B} (that determines F0 = X
b) are committed
to F1 = X
yh(aux1) in the RO model as {X,B} ⊆ aux1. The TBSS property of (s)SSJPOK can be
derived by a straightforward calculation. Proof details that (s)SSJPOK are NMJPOK in the RO model
are given below.
Proposition B.1 SSJPOK is NMJPOK in the RO Model.
Proof. We first prove the self-sealed computational independence of SSJPOK in the RO model. Note
that for SSJPOK, F0 = X
db = Xh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B,Y )b and F1 = X
ey = Xh(X,Y )y, where b, y, x ∈ Z∗q . For any given
challenge X ∈ G \ 1G, each pair of values (B = g
b, Y = gy) ∈ (G \ 1G)
2 (that determine (b, y) ∈ (Z∗q )
2)
and any pair of given values α = gαˆ, β = gβˆ ∈ (G \ 1G)
2, where αˆ, βˆ ∈ Z∗q , we consider the set of values
that F0 can be assigned in the RO model SF0 = {X
db|0 ≤ d = h(Aˆ, Bˆ, B, Y ) ≤ 2l − 1} and also the set
of values that F1 can be assigned in the RO model SF1 = {X
ey|0 ≤ e = h(X,Y ) ≤ 2l − 1}. If α 6∈ SF0
or d = 0 (resp., β 6∈ SF1 or e = 0), then we have Pr[F0 = α] = 0 (resp., Pr[F1 = β] = 0). If α ∈ SF0
(resp., β ∈ SF1), then we have Pr[F0 = α] =
1
2l−1
(resp., Pr[F1 = β] =
1
2l−1
) in the RO model. As
the malicious prover Bˆ is polynomial-time, we have that, no matter the polynomial-time malicious Bˆ
does on a challenge X, the probability that it outputs B,Y such that F0 = α and F1 = β is negligible.
Specifically, suppose N = 2l − 1 and T = poly(l) is the running time of Bˆ, by the birthday paradox the
probability that on input (X,α, β) the malicious Bˆ outputs (B,Y ) such that F0 = α or F1 = β is at
most T (T−1)2N that is negligible (in l).
Next we prove the TBSS property of SSJPOK in the RO model, which is based on and can be
easily derived from the NMJPOK property of OAKE. For a complete session of SSJPOK, its tag is:
Tag = (Aˆ, Bˆ, B = gb,X = gx, Y = gy), where b, x, y ∈ Z∗q , we consider the value ZTag = X
db+ey =
Xh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B,Y )b ·Xh(X,Y )y in the RO model where h is assumed to be a random oracle. As for each value
α ∈ G \ 1G, Pr[X
h(Aˆ,Bˆ,B,Y )b = α] ≤ 1
2l−1
and Pr[Xh(X,Y )y = α] ≤ 1
2l−1
in the RO model, we get (by
straightforward calculation) that Pr[ZTag = α] ≤ O(
1
2l
). 
Proposition B.2 sSSJPOK is NMJPOK in the RO model.
Proof. We first show the committed computational independence property of sSSJPOK. Similar to
the analysis of Proposition B.1, for the case δ = 1 we have that for any given α ∈ G \ 1G and any DH-
component challenge X, and any (B,Y ) ∈ (G \ 1G)
2, Pr[Fδ = X
yh(aux1) = Xyh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B,X,Y ) = α] ≤ 1
2l−1
in the RO model, where δ = 1. As the malicious Bˆ is polynomial-time, we have the probability that
the malicious Bˆ outputs (B,Y ), given a random challenge X and a given value α ∈ G \ 1G, such that
F1 = α is negligible in the RO model.
2 Then, the committed computational independence of sSSJPOK
is from the following observation that Xb is committed to Xyh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B,X,Y ). Specifically,
2Specifically, by the birthday paradox, the probability is at most O(T
2
2l
), where T = poly(l) is the running time of Bˆ.
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• S1−δ = S0 = {X,B} ⊆ auxδ = aux1 = {Aˆ, Bˆ, B,X, Y }. Note that the value F0 = Z0 = X
b (resp.,
F1 = f
h
1 (Z1, aux1) = f
h
1 (X
y , aux1) = X
yh(aux1) = Xyh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B,X,Y )) is determined by S0 = {X,B}
(resp., aux1 = {Aˆ, Bˆ, B,X, Y }), and aux0 is empty for sSSJPOK.
• Given Zδ = Z1 = X
y and auxδ = aux1 = {Aˆ, Bˆ, B,X, Y }, for any B
′ 6= B such that S′0 =
{X,B′} ⊆ aux′1 = {Aˆ, Bˆ, B
′,X, Y }, we get Pr[fh1 (Z1, aux1) = f
h
1 (Z1, aux
′
1)] = Pr[X
yh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B,X,Y ) =
Xyh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B
′,X,Y )] ≤ 1
2l−1
. Thus for any polynomial-time algorithm, the probability that it, on in-
put Z1, aux1, outputs S
′
0 = {X,B
′} for B′ 6= B such that Xyh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B,X,Y ) = Xyh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B
′,X,Y ) is
negligible (again by the birthday paradox).
Next, we show the TBSS property of sSSJPOK in the RO model, which is based on and can be
easily derived from the NMJPOK property of OAKE. For the tag Tag = (Aˆ, Bˆ, B,X, Y ) of a complete
session of sSSJPOK, we consider the value ZTag = X
b+yh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B,X,Y ) = Xb ·Xyh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B,X,Y ). No matter
what value Xb is, for any value α ∈ G \ 1G we have Pr[X
yh(Aˆ,Bˆ,B,X,Y ) = α] ≤ 1
2l−1
in the RO model.
Thus, for any value α ∈ G \ 1G we have also that Pr[ZTag = α] ≤
1
2l−1
= O( 1
2l
). 
C Some Variants of (s)OAKE
One-round OAKE (oOAKE): The player Aˆ sends X = gx to Bˆ. Normally, Aˆ is a client machine
and Bˆ is a server machine. Let KAˆ = B
a+ex and KBˆ = A
bXeb, where e = h(Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X) and the
session-key is K = HK(KAˆ) = HK(KBˆ). For oOAKE, it is also recommend to set the output length
of h to be shorter, e.g., |q|/2, to ease the computation of KBˆ = A
bXeb = (AXe)b in some application
scenarios (e.g., when the pre-computation of Ab is inconvenient).
Note that the computational complexity of Aˆ is 2 exponentiations in total and all the computation
of Aˆ can be offline. To improve the on-line efficiency of Bˆ, the player Bˆ can pre-compute Ab in an
off-line way (and store it in a database entry corresponding to the client Aˆ), and only on-line computes
Xeb and Xq which amounts to about 1.2 exponentiations (it is recommended for Bˆ to explicitly check
the subgroup membership of X). In case of embedded subgroup test, Bˆ should explicitly check X ∈ G′
and Xebt 6= 1G (only checking KBˆ 6= 1G is not sufficient to prevent the small subgroup attack). We
remind that oOAKE intrinsically suffers from the key compromise impersonation (KCI) vulnerability in
case Bˆ’s static secret-key b is compromised, and lacks perfect forward secrecy (the same vulnerabilities
hold also for one-round variant of HMQV).
Robust (s)OAKE: The only difference between robust (s)OAKE and (s)OAKE is that, the values
KAˆ and KBˆ in robust (s)OAKE are set to be: KAˆ = B
a+xdY ac+xe and KBˆ = A
b+ycXbd+ye. Specifically,
the values KAˆ and KBˆ in OAKE and sOAKE are now multiplied with the value g
ab in robust OAKE
and robust sOAKE.
We show in Appendix G.2.1 that the provable security of (s)OAKE in the CK-framework can be
easily extended to robust (s)OAKE under the same complexity assumptions.
Adding (explicit) mutual authentication. For adding mutual authentication to (s)OAKE,
besides the session-key K we also need a MAC-key Km to be used within the protocol run (but erased
after the protocol run). Both the session-key and MAC-key are derived from the shared DH-secret
KAˆ = KBˆ , and are independent in the random oracle model. For (s)OAKE with mutual authentication,
Bˆ sends an additional value tB = MACKm(1) in the second-round, and Aˆ sends tA = MACKm(0) in
an additional third-round. For oOAKE with mutual authentication, the player Aˆ can additionally send
tA = MACKm(0) in the first-round, and the player Bˆ responds back MACKm(1) in the subsequent
round. In practice, the message authentication code MAC can be instantiated with HMAC [6].
D More Discussions on the Specification of (s)OAKE
Subgroup test vs. ephemeral DH-exponent leakage. We note that the damage caused by ignoring
the subgroup test of peer’s DH-component (but still with the supergroup G′ membership check) can
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be much relieved (and even waived), if the ephemeral private values generated within the protocol run
are well-protected. For example, even if an adversary learns some partial information about db+ ey by
issuing a small subgroup attack against the honest Bˆ (by setting X to be in a small subgroup), it still
cannot derive the value b without compromising the ephemeral value y. Also note that the adversary
actually cannot derive the full value of db + ey by small subgroup attacks, as the DH-exponent y
is independent at random in each session. In this case, we suggest that embedded subgroup test is
sufficient. For presentation simplicity and unity, in the rest of this paper, it is assumed that t = Nq for
implementations with embedded subgroup test, and t = 1 with explicit subgroup test.
Ephemeral private values exposable to adversary. The ephemeral private values exposable
to adversary, generated by the honest Bˆ (resp., Aˆ) during the protocol run, are specified to be: y
(resp., x) if Bˆ (resp., Aˆ) does not pre-compute Acy (resp., Bdx), or (y,Acy) (resp., (x,Bdx)) if Bˆ (resp.,
Aˆ) pre-computes Acy (resp., Bdx). Other ephemeral private values are erased promptly after use. We
remark all ephemeral private values, except for the session-key in case the session is successfully finished,
generated by an honest party within the protocol run are erased after the session is completed (whether
finished or aborted). For expired sessions, the session-keys are also erased.
E More Discussions on the Security of (s)OAKE vs. HMQV
Assuming all the DH-components generated by all uncorrupted players are not exposed to the at-
tacker prior to the sessions involving them (e.g., all honest players only generate fresh ephemeral DH-
components on the fly, i.e., without pre-computation, in each session), and assuming all the ephemeral
DH-exponents generated during session runs are unexposed to the attacker, the SK-security of HMQV
can be based on the CDH assumption, while we do not know how to prove this property with (s)OAKE.
This is the only advantage of HMQV over (s)OAKE that we can see.
However, as already stressed in [37], security against exposed DH-exponents is deemed to be the
main and prime concern for any robust DHKE, and security against exposed offline pre-computed values
(particularly, the DH-components) is important to both lower-power devices and to high volume servers
[37]. The reason is, as pointed out in [37], many applications in practice will boost protocol performance
by pre-computing and storing values for later use in the protocol. In this case, however, these stored
values are more vulnerable to leakage, particularly when DHKE is deployed in hostile environments
with plagued spyware or virus and in view of that the offline pre-computed DH-components are much
less protected in practice as they are actually public values to be exchanged in plain.
Also, for DHKE protocols running concurrently in settings like the Internet, we suggest it is unrea-
sonable or unrealistic to assume non-precomputation and non-exposure of the public DH-components
for all uncorrupted parties in the system. Note that, whenever there is an uncorrupted player whose
DH-component is exposed prior to the session in which the DH-component is to be used (the attacker
can just set this session as the test-session), the security of HMQV relies on both the GDH assumption
and the KEA assumption in most cases as clarified in Section 4.1.
For the above reasons, we suggest that the security advantage of HMQV over (s)OAKE in this
special case is insignificant in reality. Note that, even in this special case, (s)OAKE enjoys other
security advantages: (1) stronger embedded subgroup test supported by offline pre-computability of
Acy and Bdx; (2) resistance to more powerful secrecy exposure of the additional pre-computed private
values Acy and Bdx; (3) stronger resistance against collision attacks on the underlying hash function h;
(4) tighter security reduction of sOAKE. Further note that, in the case of pre-computed and exposed
DH-components, (s)OAKE is based upon weaker assumptions (i.e., only the GDH assumption) than
(H)MQV (that is based on both the GDH assumption and the KEA assumption) for the most often
case of Aˆ 6= Bˆ.
(s)OAKE vs. robust (s)OAKE. Note that, in comparison with (s)OAKE that enjoys reasonable
deniability, the variant of robust (s)OAKE proposed in Appendix C loses the reasonable deniability
property. But, it seems that robust (s)OAKE may render seemingly stronger security, in the sense that
even both the ephemeral DH-exponents x and y are exposed by an adversary the adversary still cannot
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compute the DH-secret KAˆ or KBˆ. We suggest that such a security advantage of robust (s)OAKE over
the plain (s)OAKE is not significant, based on the following observation:
• If we assume a powerful adversary that can expose both ephemeral DH-exponents x and y for the
test session, then it may also be reasonable to assume that the adversary can expose one of the
values (KAˆ,KBˆ) for that exposed session. Note that, from (x, y) and one of the values (KAˆ,KBˆ),
the adversary can compute the value gab. As the value gab is fixed and used in all sessions, once the
value gab is gotten the adversary can compute the session-key for all other sessions with exposed
both ephemeral DH-exponents.
In the CK-framework, the test-session and its matching session (in case the matching session exists)
are assumed to be unexposed. That is, in the CK-framework, the adversary is only allowed to exposed
ephemeral DH-exponents (and maybe other private values) for sessions other than the test-session and
its matching session. Actually, as we show in Appendix G, (s)OAKE is secure in the CK-framework
assuming exposed DH-exponents (x, y) and off-line computed values (Acy, Bdx).
Based on the above observations, we suggest (s)OAKE achieves much better balance between security
and privacy than robust (s)OAKE.
F Formulation and Analysis of (Session-Key) Computational
Fairness
In Section 4.2, we introduced the new perspective of “computational fairness” for DHKE by concrete
EDA attacks against (H)MQV, and showed that computational unfairness can cause some essential
security damages to DHKE protocols. We now consider how to formulate “computational fairness” for
DHKE protocols.
A first thought is to require that, to successfully finish a session (with session-key output) with
an honest player (e.g., player Bˆ), the computation of the malicious player (e.g., Aˆ) and that of its
honest peer should have the same computational complexity. But, such a formulation is imprecise
and does not work. With (s)OAKE as an example, the honest player Bˆ has two ways to compute
KBˆ = A
cyXdb+ye: one way is to use the simultaneous exponentiation techniques, which amounts to
about 1.3 exponentiations; and another way is to compute two separate exponentiations Acy (that can
be offline computed) and Xdb+ey and then multiply them to get KBˆ . Moreover, there exist a number
of different methods for simultaneous exponentiations with (slightly) varying computational complexity
[43, 30, 22]. Thus, simply requiring the computational complexity of a malicious player and that of its
honest peer to be the same is meaningless in general.
In this work, we focus on session-key computational fairness, i.e., the computational fairness in
computing the session-key, for implicitly authenticated DHKE protocols like (H)MQV and (s)OAKE
as are the focus of this work (extension to general interactive protocols is discussed later). For any
complete session-tag (e.g., Tag = (Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y ) here for (H)MQV and (s)OAKE)) and I ∈ {Aˆ, Bˆ},
we first identify dominant-operation values w.r.t. Tag and I, (V I1 , · · · , V
I
mI ) ∈ G1 × · · · ×GmI ,mI ≥ 2,
which are specified to compute the session-key K by honest player I ∈ {Aˆ, Bˆ} for a complete session of
DHKE specified by the complete session-tag Tag, where Gi, 1 ≤ i ≤ mI is the range of V
I
i . Specifically,
K = FK(V
I
1 , · · · , V
I
mI , Tag), whereK is the session-key output, FK is some polynomial-time computable
function (that is defined by the session-key computation specified for honest players). The dominant-
operation values of a complete session are random variables defined over the complete session-tag (as well
as the choice of the random function in the RO model). We remark that dominant operations are specific
to protocols, where for different key-exchange protocols the dominant operations can also be different.
For (s)OAKE and (H)MQV, the dominant operation is defined just to be modular exponentiation.
Then, roughly speaking, we say that a DHKE protocol enjoys session-key computational fairness, if for
any complete session-tag Tag, the session-key computation involves the same number of non-malleably
independent dominant-operation values for both I ∈ {Aˆ, Bˆ}. Here, “non-malleable independence”
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is defined in reminiscent of Definition B.1. Specifically, we consider two notions of “non-malleably
independence”.
Definition F.1 (strong non-malleable independence) For the dominant-operation values,
(V I1 , · · · , V
I
mI ) ∈ G1 × · · · × Gm, m ≥ 2 and I ∈ {Aˆ, Bˆ}, w.r.t. a complete session-tag Tag on any
sufficiently large security parameter n, we say V I1 , · · · , V
I
mI are strongly computationally (resp., per-
fectly) non-malleably independent, if for any polynomial-time computable (resp., any power unlimited)
relation/algorithm R (with components drawn from G1× · · · ×GmI ×{0, 1}
∗) it holds that the following
quantity is negligible in n (resp., just 0):
|Pr[R(V I1 , · · · , V
I
mI
, Tag) = 1]− Pr[R(U1, · · · , UmI , Tag) = 1],
where Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ mI is taken uniformly at random from Gi, and the probability is taken over the
random coins of R (as well as the choice of the random function in the random oracle model).
Remark: Note that the above Definition F.1 is defined w.r.t. any complete session-tag, which does
not explicitly take the malicious player’s ability into account. But, this definition ensures that, by the
birthday paradox, for any successfully finished session between a malicious player (e.g., player I = Bˆ)
and an honest player (e.g., player Aˆ), no matter how the malicious player does (on the identity and
DH-challenge of the honest player, i.e., (A,X)), it holds that: for any (α1, · · · , αmI ) ∈ (G \ 1G)
mI ,
the probability that Pr[V Ii = αi] is negligible for any i, 1 ≤ i ≤ mI . The reason is: for each concrete
choice of (B,Y ) by Bˆ (which then determines a complete session-tag), the distribution of the values
(V I1 , · · · , V
I
mI ) is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution. As the malicious player is polynomial-
time (i.e., can make at most polynomial number of choices), by the birthday paradox it holds that the
malicious player can set V Ii to be a predetermined value only with negligible probability. This means
that the malicious player cannot make the values (V I1 , · · · , V
I
mI ) maliciously correlated (under any pre-
determined polynomial-time computable relation) with non-negligible probability. In this sense, the
notion of “self-sealed computational independence” in accordance with Definition B.1 (which is defined
specific to NMJPOK for proving the joint knowledge of b and y w.r.t. a single DH-challenge X) can be
viewed as a special and weaker case of strong non-malleable independence defined here.
Definition F.2 (general non-malleable independence) For the dominant-operation values,
(V I1 , · · · , V
I
mI ) ∈ G1 × · · · × GmI , mI ≥ 2 and I ∈ {Aˆ, Bˆ}, w.r.t. a complete session-tag Tag on
any sufficiently large security parameter n, we say V I1 , · · · , V
I
mI are generally computationally (resp.,
perfectly) non-malleably independent, if there exists at most one j, 1 ≤ j ≤ mI such that for any
polynomial-time computable (resp., any power unlimited) relation/algorithm R (with components drawn
from G1 × · · · ×GmI × {0, 1}
∗) it holds that the following quantity is negligible in n (resp., just 0):
|Pr[R(V I1 , · · · , V
I
j , · · · , V
I
mI , Tag) = 1]− Pr[R(U1, · · · , Uj−1, V
I
j , Uj+1, · · · , UmI , Tag) = 1],
where Ui, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ mI is taken uniformly at random from Gi, and the probability is taken over the
random coins of R (as well as the choice of the random function in the random oracle model).
Remark: The definition of general non-malleable independence says that the distribution of (V I1 , · · · ,
V Ij−1, V
I
j , V
I
j+1, · · · , V
I
mI
) is computationally indistinguishable from (U1, · · · , Uj−1, V
I
j , Uj+1, · · · , UmI ).
As the values (U1, · · · , Uj−1, V
I
j , Uj+1, · · · , UmI ) are mutually independent, it then implies that the
values of (V I1 , · · · , V
I
j−1, V
I
j , V
I
j+1, · · · , V
I
mI
) are also computationally independent. This definition also
ensures that, no matter how a malicious polynomial-time player I ∈ {Aˆ, Bˆ} does, (by the birthday
paradox) it holds that: (1) The malicious player cannot make the values (V I1 , · · · , V
I
j−1, V
I
j+1, · · · , V
I
mI )
correlated to V Ij under any predetermined polynomial-time computable relation. In particular, for any
(α1, · · · , αj−1, αj+1, · · · , αmI ) ∈ (G \ 1G)
mI−1, Pr[V Ii = αi] is negligible for any i, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ mI . (2)
Any efforts of the malicious player in order to change the value V Ij (which then changes the session-tag)
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will cause all other values (V I1 , · · · , V
I
j−1, V
I
j+1, · · · , V
I
mI ) changed (to some values indistinguishable from
random ones). Thus, the malicious player is also infeasible to set the value V Ij correlated to any of the
values (V I1 , · · · , V
I
j−1, V
I
j+1, · · · , V
I
mI ). This also further implies that the value V
I
j is committed to V
I
i for
any i, 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ mI , in the sense that: the malicious player cannot (with non-negligible probability
by the birthday paradox) output two different session tags on which the values V Ij are different but
the value V Ii remains the same. In this sense, the notion of “committed computational independence”
in accordance with Definition B.1 (which is defined specific to sNMJPOK) can be viewed as a special
and weaker case of general non-malleable independence defined here. Finally, it is direct that strong
non-malleable independence is stronger than general non-malleable independence.
Definition F.3 ((session-key) computational fairness) We say a DHKE protocol has session-key
computational fairness, if for any complete session-tag Tag on any sufficiently large security parameter
n, the session-key computation involves the same number of non-malleably independent dominant-
operation values for any I ∈ {Aˆ, Bˆ}. That is, for any complete session-tag Tag on sufficiently large
security parameter and for each player I ∈ {Aˆ, Bˆ}, it holds that: (1) the dominant-operation values
V I1 , · · · , V
I
mI
w.r.t. Tag, involved in computing the session-key via FK(V
I
1 , · · · , V
I
mI
, Tag), are (strong
or general) non-malleably independent, and (2) mAˆ = mBˆ, where FK is some predetermined polynomial-
time computable function specified to compute session-key (according to protocol specification).
Remark: Though session-key computational fairness is defined w.r.t. any complete session tag,
according to the discussions following Definition F.1 and Definition F.3, it particularly ensures that:
for any polynomial-time malicious player I, no matter how it does, (by the birthday paradox) it is
infeasible to make the values V I1 , · · · , V
I
mI
(involved in session-key computation) correlated under any
predetermined polynomial-time computable relation. Note that we used the number of non-malleably
independent dominant-operation values involved in session-key computation as the measurement for
session-key computational fairness. The reason we require the dominant-operation values to be non-
malleably independent is that, without such a requirement, as shown by our EDA attacks on (H)MQV,
an adversary can potentially set these values maliciously correlated such that the session-key can be
computed much more easily (than the ways specified for honest players) even without knowing any of the
dominant-operation values. The reason we only require the dominant-operation values involved (rather
than computed) in session-key computation is that, there can be multiple different ways to compute the
session-key from dominant-operation values. With the function FK(V1, V2) = HK(V1 ·V2) as an example,
where V1 and V2 are non-malleably independent, one can compute two separate exponentiations V1 and
V2 and then compute the session-key, but one can also use the simultaneous exponentiations technique
to compute V1 · V2 with only about 1.3 exponentiations. Furthermore, there are a number of different
methods for simultaneous exponentiations with (slightly) varying computational complexities. But,
with any computation way, the value of FK(V1, V2) = HK(V1 · V2) has to be computed, with which two
non-malleably independent exponentiations are involved.
Remark: We note that the issue of computational fairness can apply to interactive protocols in
general, as long as the honest players have the same computational operations under protocol specifica-
tions.3 For implicitly authenticated DHKE protocols like (H)MQV and (s)OAKE, we only considered
here the session-key computational fairness. In general, for key-exchange protocols with explicit authen-
tication (e.g., via signatures and/or MACs), besides session-key computational fairness, we need also
consider authentication computational fairness. The formulation of session-key computational fairness
is also instrumental in formulating authentication computational fairness, which is beyond the scope of
this work.
Proposition F.1 (s)OAKE is session-key computationally fair assuming h : {0, 1}∗ → G \ 1G is a
random oracle, while (H)MQV is not session-key computationally fair.
3In particular, most key-exchange protocols are protocols of such type, while key distribution protocols (e.g., via public-
key encryption) are not.
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Proof. For both (s)OAKE and (H)MQV, the dominant operation (involved in session-key computation)
is defined to be modular exponentiation. A complete session-tag consists of (Aˆ, A = ga, Bˆ, B = gb,X =
gx, Y = gy).
For (s)OAKE and any complete session-tag Tag, the dominant operation values specified for the
player Aˆ (resp., Bˆ) are V Aˆ1 = B
dx ∈ G \ 1G and V
Aˆ
2 = Y
ca+ex ∈ G \ 1G (resp., V
Bˆ
1 = A
cy and
V Bˆ2 = X
db+ey), where c = h(Aˆ, A, Y ), d = h(Bˆ, B,X), e = h(X,Y ) (resp., c = d = 1 and e =
h(Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y )) for OAKE (resp., sOAKE). The function FK is specified to be FK(V1, V2, str) =
HK(V1 · V2). It is clear that, similar to the analysis of Proposition B.1 and Proposition B.2, the distri-
bution of (V I1 , V
I
2 ), for both I ∈ {Aˆ, Bˆ}, is identical to that of (U1, U2) for OAKE (resp., (V
I
1 , U2) for
sOAKE) in the random oracle model, where Ui, i ∈ {1, 2} is taken uniformly at random from G \ 1G.
That is, (V I1 , V
I
2 ) are strongly perfect non-malleably independent for OAKE (resp., generally perfect
non-malleably independent for sOAKE). Thus, both OAKE and sOAKE enjoy session-key computa-
tional fairness.
For (H)MQV and any complete session-tag Tag, the dominant operation values specified for the
player Aˆ (resp., Bˆ) are V Aˆ1 = Y
x+da ∈ G and V Aˆ2 = B
e(x+da) ∈ G (resp., V Bˆ1 = X
y+eb and V Bˆ2 =
Ad(y+eb)), where d = h(X, Bˆ), e = h(Y, Aˆ) for HMQV (resp., d = 2l + (X mod 2l) and e = 2l + (Y
mod 2l) for MQV). The function FK is specified to be FK(V1, V2, str) = HK(V1 ·V2). Our concrete EDA
attacks presented in Section 4.2 demonstrate that both MQV and HMQV do not satisfy computational
fairness. Specifically, consider the following specific relations (corresponding to the two specific cases of
our attack): (1) R(V1, V2, Tag) = 1 iff V1 ·V2 = 1G; (2) R(V1, V2, Tag) = 1 iff V1 ·V2 = Y Be, where Y Be
can be publicly computed from the session-tag Tag. For all these specific relations, there exist complete
session-tags Tag (corresponding to the sessions caused by the EDA attacks presented in Section 4.2)
such that Pr[R(V Aˆ1 , V
Aˆ
2 , Tag) = 1] = 1, while Pr[R(U1, U2, Tag) = 1] = 1 or Pr[R(V
Aˆ
1 , U2, Tag) = 1] = 1
or Pr[R(U1, V
Aˆ
2 , Tag) = 1] = 1 is always negligible w.r.t. these specific relations (as each of the values
of U1 · U2, V
Aˆ
1 · U2 and U1 · V
Aˆ
1 is distributed uniformly over G \ 1G). 
Remark: By the session-key computational fairness property of (s)OAKE, the session-key com-
putation involves two non-malleably independent values Acy and Xdb+ey no matter how a malicious
Bˆ does (i.e., Bˆ is infeasible to make the values Acy and Xdb+ey correlated under any predetermined
polynomial-time computable relation). If we view each non-malleably independent exponentiation value
as a proof-of-knowledge of the corresponding exponent, then to compute the session-key any PPT player
has to ”know” both cy and db + ey, from which both the static secret-key b and the ephemeral DH-
exponent y can be efficiently derived. In this sense, the session-key computation of (s)OAKE itself
can be viewed as a non-malleable join proof-of-knowledge of both b and y. This further implies that a
malicious player is infeasible to set the session-key to some values that can be publicly computed from
the session transcript.
Comparisons with the fairness notions in secure multi-party computation (SMC). The
notion of “fairness” was intensively studied in the literature of secure multi-party computation (see [28]
for an overview of the various fairness notions considered in SMC). Informally speaking, a protocol
is fair if either all the parties learn the output of the function, or no party learns anything (about
the output). This property is also referred to as “complete fairness” (along with many variants),
which mainly deals with prematurely adversarial aborting. To bypass some impossibility results on
achieving fair SMC protocols with a majority of corrupted players, the work [26] introduced the notion
of “resource fair SMC”. The resource fairness considered in [26] is still a variant of “complete fairness”.
Specifically, the “resource fairness” [26] captures “fairness through gradual release”. Here, protocols
using gradual release consist of a “computation” phase, where some computation is carried out, followed
by a “revealing” phase, where the parties gradually release their private information towards learning
the protocol output. Then, roughly speaking, resource fairness requires that the honest players and the
adversary run essentially the same number of steps in order to obtain protocol output.
Casting “fairness through gradual release” into DHKE, it means that: players Aˆ and Bˆ gradually
release their DH-exponents X and Y in sequential steps, so that both parties can output the session-key
or both cannot. Clearly, the notions of “complete fairness” and “resource fairness” considered in the
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literature of SMC are significantly different from the session-key computational fairness formulated and
considered in this work. Specifically, we assume both parties honestly send their DH-exponents, and
computational fairness is about the session-key computation complexity. That is, our computational
fairness is to capture the fairness between non-aborting players in computing session-key outputs (i.e., if
both players do not abort, they should invest essentially the same computational resources in computing
the session-key output), while “complete fairness” and its variant in the literature of SMC mainly deal
with prematurely adversarial aborting. Also, the resource fairness considered in [26] is relative to
experiment in which the protocol is run or the protocol needs to be aware of the computational power
of the adversary (up to a constant) [26].
F.1 On Fixing HMQV to Achieve Computational Fairness
In [2, 1], we proposed some variants of (H)MQV, just in the spirit of (s)OAKE and NMJPOK to prevent
our EDA attacks and to render the property of session-key computational fairness. The key point is
to put A (resp., B) into the input of d (resp., e). Specifically, we have the following fixing approaches,
by setting (1) d = h(X, Bˆ,A) and e = h(Y, Aˆ,B); or (2) d = h(Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y ) and e = h(d); or
(3) d = h(Aˆ, A,X) and e = h(Bˆ, B, Y ), etc. Other components remain unchanged. For the above
third fixing solution, in order to get only one exponentiation online efficiency, we can make some further
modifications by setting KAˆ = (Y
eB)xd+a, KBˆ = (X
dA)ye+b, where d = h(Aˆ, A,X) and e = h(Bˆ, B, Y );
The session-key is still K = HK(KAˆ) = HK(KBˆ). For presentation simplicity, we refer to this solution
as the fourth fixing solution (this protocol variant is named as OAKE-MQV in [2, 1]).
Unfortunately, we failed in providing the provable security for any of the above HMQV variants in
the CK-framework. In particular, we do not know how to extend the security proof of HMQV in [37]
to any of the above four fixing solutions. Indeed, HMQV was very carefully designed to enjoy provable
security in the CK-framework. Below, we present some concrete obstacles in extending the proof of
HMQV [37] to these HMQV variants. But, there can be more obstacles.
• For the first and the second solutions, we note that the proof of HMQV for the case of A = B
(specifically, the proof of Lemma 24 in Section 6.3) fails. The underlying reason is: the inputs of d
and the inputs of e share some common values, such that in the repeated experiment of redefining
e the value d will also be changed.
• For the third and the fourth solutions, we do not know how to extend the proofs of Lemma 11
(to be more precise, Case-3 of Claim 13), Lemma 17 and Lemma 29 to these two solutions. The
underlying reason is: the messages to be signed by the signer Bˆ by the underlying XCR or DCR
signatures (defined in accordance with the third and the fourth solutions) are the fixed value
(Bˆ, B), while in HMQV the message to be signed is its peer’s identity Aˆ that may be set by the
adversary. In addition, for the fourth solution, the proof of Lemma 27 also fails. The underlying
reason is about the order of d and e in order to compute the value Xb. Also, the third and the
fourth solutions have the following disadvantage that, in case the intermediate private value y+eb
(computed by Bˆ in a session) is leaked, this leaked value allows an adversary to impersonate Bˆ
in any other sessions (no matter what the values (X,A) are).
Besides lacking provable security in the CK-framework, many other advantageous features enjoyed
by (s)OAKE (as clarified in Section 4) are also lost with the above fixing solutions. To the best of
our knowledge, we do not know how to achieve, besides the OAKE family, implicitly authenticated
DHKE protocols that enjoy all the following properties: (1) provable security in the CK-framework;
(2) online optimal efficiency and/or reasonable deniability; (3) session-key computational fairness. The
surrounding issues are quite subtle and tricky, and indeed (s)OAKE was very carefully designed to
achieve all these features (and much more as clarified in Section 4).
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G Security Analysis of (s)OAKE in the CK-Framework
One of main conceptual contributions of the analysis of HMQV in the CK-framework [37] is to cast the
design of HMQV in terms of Hashed Dual challenge-Response (HDR) signatures and Hashed Challenge-
Response (HCR) signatures, which are in turn based on Dual Challenge-Response (DCR) signatures and
eXponential Challenge-Response (XCR) signatures and can be traced back to Schnorr’s identification
scheme [54]. We show that OAKE and sOAKE all can be casted in terms of HDR signatures. Moreover,
the HDR signatures implied by the (s)OAKE protocols, referred to as OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR,
are both online efficient and strongly secure. This provides extra security strength of the underlying
building tools, say SSJOPK and sSSJPOK, used in (s)OAKE. To this end, we first demonstrate a
divided forking lemma with a new family of signature schemes, which may itself be of independent
interest.
G.1 A New Family of Signature Schemes, and Divided Forking Lemma
Notation note: For presentation simplicity, in this subsection, we a bit abuse the notations of
a, c, d, e, f, k, s, z, ρ, C, which are different from the notations used outside this subsection.
A common paradigm, known as the Fiat-Shamir paradigm [24], of obtaining signatures is to collapse
a 3-round public-coin honest-verifier zero-knowledge, known as Σ-protocol, into a non-interactive scheme
with hash functions that are modeled to be random oracles [9].
Definition G.1 (Σ-protocol [16]) A three-round public-coin protocol 〈P, V 〉 is said to be a Σ-protocol
for an NP-relation R if the following hold:
• Completeness. If P , V follow the protocol, the verifier always accepts.
• Special soundness. From any common input U of length n and any pair of accepting conversations
on input U , (a, e, z) and (a, e′, z′) where e 6= e′, one can efficiently compute w such that (U,w) ∈ R
with overwhelming probability. Here a, e, z stand for the first, the second and the third message
respectively and e is assumed to be a string of length l (that is polynomially related to n) selected
uniformly at random in {0, 1}l.
• Perfect/statistical SHVZK (special honest verifier zero-knowledge). There exists a probabilistic
polynomial-time (PPT) simulator S, which on input U (where there exists an NP-witness w such
that (U,w) ∈ R) and a random challenge string eˆ, outputs an accepting conversation of the form
(aˆ, eˆ, zˆ), with the same probability distribution as that of the real conversation (a, e, z) between the
honest P (w), V on input U .
The first Σ-protocol (for an NP-language) in the literature can be traced back to the honest verifier
zero-knowledge (HVZK) protocol for Graph Isomorphism [27] (but the name of Σ-protocol is adopted
much later in [16]), and a large number of Σ-protocols for various languages have been developed now.
Σ-protocols have been proved to be a very powerful cryptographic tool, and are widely used in numerous
important cryptographic applications. Below, we briefly recall the Σ-protocol examples for DLP and
RSA.
Σ-Protocol for DLP [54]. The following is a Σ-protocol 〈P, V 〉 proposed by Schnorr [54] for
proving the knowledge of discrete logarithm, w, for a common input of the form (p, q, g, U) such that
U = gw mod p, where p, q are primes g is an element in Z∗p of order q. Normally, the length of q, |q|, is
denoted as the security parameter.
• P chooses r at random in Zq and sends a = g
r mod p to V .
• V chooses a challenge e at random in Z2l and sends it to P . Here, l is fixed such that 2
l < q.
• P sends z = r + ew mod q to V , who checks that gz = aU e mod p, that p, q are prime and that
g, h are of order q, and accepts iff this is the case.
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Σ-Protocol for RSA [31]. Let n be an RSA modulus and q be a prime. Assume we are given
some element y ∈ Z∗n, and P knows an element w such that w
q = y mod n. The following protocol is
a Σ-protocol for proving the knowledge of q-th roots modulo n.
• P chooses r at random in Z∗n and sends a = r
q mod n to V .
• V chooses a challenge e at random in Z2l and sends it to P . Here, l is fixed such that 2
l < q.
• P sends z = rwe mod n to V , who checks that zq = aye mod n, that q is a prime, that gcd(a, n) =
gcd(y, n) = 1, and accepts iff this is the case.
The Fiat-Shamir paradigm and its provable security. Given any Σ-protocol (a, e, z) on
common input U (which will be viewed as signing public-key), the Fiat-Shamir paradigm collapse the
Σ-protocol into a signature scheme as follows: (a, e = h(a,m), z), where m is the message to be signed
and h is a hash function. Note in actual signature scheme with the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, the generated
signature only consists of (e, z) as the value a can be computed from (e, z). The provable security of
the general Fiat-Shamir paradigm is shown by Pointcheval and Stern [53] in the random oracle model
(assuming h to be an idealized random function). The core of the security arguments of Pointcheval
and Stern [53] is a forking lemma.
On-line/off-line signature. The notion of on-line/off-line signature is introduced in [23]. The idea
is to perform signature generation into two phases: the off-line phase and the on-line phase. On-line/off-
line signature schemes are useful, since in many applications the signer (e.g., a smart-card) has a very
limited response time once the message is presented (but it can carry out costly computations between
consecutive signing requests). The on-line phase is typically very fast, and hence can be executed even
on a weak processor. On-line/off-line signature schemes are particularly remarkable in smart-card based
applications [55]: the off-line phase can be implemented either during the card manufacturing process
or as a background computation whenever the card is connected to power.
Note that for signature schemes obtained via the Fiat-Shamir scheme, the signer can pre-compute
and store a list of values (a = gr, r). Then, to sign a message m, it simply computes e = h(a,m) and
z. With Schnorr’s signature as an illustrative example, in this case, the signer only needs to perform
z = r + h(m,a)w online, where a = gr and r are offline pre-computed and stored. Some general
transformation from any signature scheme to secure off-line/off-line signature scheme are know (e.g.,
[23, 55]), but typically are not as efficient (for both computational complexity and space complexity of
the signer) as the signature resultant directly via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm.
The Digital Signature Standard (DSS). The DSS scheme [25] is a variant of Schnorr’s signature
[54] via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm. The general structure of DSS is as follows:
• Public-key: U = gw ∈ G′, where w ∈ Z∗q . Typically, w is a 160-bit prime.
• Secret-key: w.
• Signature generation: Let m ∈ {0, 1}∗ be the message to be signed.
1. Compute a = gr mod p, where r is taken randomly from Zq. Compute d = f(a), where
f : G′ → Z∗q is a conversion function.
Typically, for DSS with G′ = Z∗p , f is just the “mod q” operation; for DSS with G
′ being
some elliptic curve group over a finite field (i.e., a stands for an elliptic curve point (x, y)),
f(a) is to take the x-coordinate of a.
2. Compute s from the equation h(m) = sr − dw mod q, as follows:
– Compute rˆ = r−1.
– Compute s = (h(m) + dw)rˆ, or s = h(m)rˆ + dwrˆ with offline pre-computed dwrˆ, where
h is a hash function.
3. Output (d, s) as the signature.
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• Signature verification: Given (e = h(m), d, s) where d, s ∈ Z∗q , the verifier verifies the signature as
follows:
– Compute sˆ = s−1.
– Verify f(gesˆUdsˆ) = d, where e = h(m).
Recall that in the DSS scheme, the signature is generated as: (d, s = er−1+dwr−1), where e = h(m),
d = f(a) and a = gr, w is the secret-key. In general, the conversion f : G′ → Z∗q also can be viewed as
RO. Observe that the value m (i.e., the message to be signed) and the value a = gr are not put into
the input of a single RO in the DSS scheme, contrary to signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir scheme
where (m,a) is put into the single RO h. The separation of m and a in the inputs of ROs and the way
of signature generation of DSS bring the following advantage to DSS.
Specifically, the signer can pre-compute a list of values a’s (just as in signature schemes via the
Fiat-Shamir paradigm), but contrary to signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm, the signer of
DSS does not need to store these pre-computed values. Specifically, for each pre-computed value a = gr,
the DSS signer can off-line compute d = f(a), r−1 and dwr−1, and only stores (d, r−1, dwr−1) (note
that it is unreasonable to assume the message to be signed is always known beforehand). Actually, for
smart-card based applications, the values (d, r−1, dwr−1)’s can be stored during the card manufacturing
process. Note that d, r−1, dwr−1 ∈ Zq while a ∈ G
′. Suppose G′ = Z∗p (where p is typically of 1024 bits
while q is of 160 bits) and the signer pre-computes k values of a, then in comparison with Schnorr’s
signature scheme the space complexity (of storing pre-computed values) is reduced from (|p|+ |q|)k to
3|q|k. But, we remark that for implementations of DSS based on elliptic curves, such an advantage is
insignificant.
Challenge-divided Σ-protocols and challenge-divided Fiat-Shamir paradigm. Next, we
show a modified Fiat-Shamir paradigm, named challenge-divided Fiat-Shamir paradigm, that is appli-
cable to a variant of Σ-protocol with divided random challenges (that is referred to as challenge-divided
Σ-protocol). Below, we first describe the challenge-divided Σ-protocols for DLP and RSA.
Challenge-divided Σ-Protocol for DLP. The common input is the same as that of Schnorr’s
protocol for DLP: (p, q, g, U) such that U = gw mod p.
• P chooses r at random in Zq and sends a = g
r mod p to V .
• V chooses a pair of challenges d, e at random in Z2l × Z2l and sends (d, e) to P . Here, l is fixed
such that 2l < q.
• P sends z = er + dw mod q (resp., z = dr + ew) to V , who checks that gz = aeUd mod p (resp.,
gz = adU e mod p), that p, q are prime and that g, h are of order q, and accepts iff this is the case.
Challenge-divided Σ-Protocol for RSA. Let n be an RSA modulus and q be a prime. The
common input is (n, q, y), and the private input is w such that y = wq mod n.
• P chooses r at random in Z∗n and sends a = r
q mod n to V .
• V chooses a pair of challenges d, e at random in Z2l × Z2l and sends (d, e) to P . Here, l is fixed
such that 2l < q.
• P sends z = rdwe mod n (resp., z = rewd mod n) to V , who checks that zq = adye mod n
(resp., zq = adye mod n), that q is a prime, that gcd(a, n) = gcd(y, n) = 1, and accepts iff this is
the case.
The challenge-divided Fiat-Shamir paradigm for challenge-divided Σ-protocols. Let F
be a one-way function (OWF) admitting challenge-divided Σ-protocols, i.e., the range of the OWF has
a challenge-divided Σ-protocol for proving the knowledge of the corresponding preimage w.r.t. the NP-
relation {(U,w)|U = F (w)}. Let the random challenge be of length Len. Denote by d, e the (divided)
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random challenges, and let U = F (w) be signer’s public-key and w the secret-key. To sign a message
m, the signer computes a, d = f˜(a), e = h˜(m), and z, and then outputs (d, z) as the signature on m,
where h˜ and f˜ are conversion functions from {0, 1}∗ to {0, 1}Len. In security analysis in the RO model,
we assume both h˜ and f˜ are hash functions that are modeled to be random oracles.
Challenge-divided Schnorr signature scheme. With Schnorr’s Σ-protocol for DLP as an il-
lustrative instance, the transformed signature via the above challenge-divided Fiat-Shamir paradigm is
called challenge-divided Schnorr signature. Note that for signatures from the above challenge-divided
Schnorr’s Σ-protocol for DLP, we have that f˜ = f and h˜ = h are conversion functions from {0, 1}∗ to
Z∗q . In practice, f can simply be the “mod q” operation for G
′ = Z∗p or the operation of taking in-
put’s x-coordinate when G′ is some elliptic curve group over a finite field. In the following, we directly
describe the online/offline version of challenge-divided Schnorr’s signature.
• Public-key: U = g−w ∈ G′, where w ∈ Z∗q .
• Secret-key: w.
• Message to be signed: m.
• Offline pre-computation: the signer pre-computes and stores (r, d, dw) (resp., (d, rd)), where r is
taken randomly by the signer from Z∗q , a = g
r, d = f(a). The signature verifier can pre-compute
e = h(m) and eˆ = e−1, in case it knows m before receiving the signature.
• Online signature generation: After receiving the message m to be signed, the signer computes
e = h(m), retrieves the pre-stored value (r, d, dw) (resp., (d, dr)), and computes z = er + dw
(resp., z = dr + ew). The signer outputs (d, z) as the signature on m.
• Signature verification: given a signature (e = h(m), d, z) where d, z ∈ Z∗q , check that d, z ∈ Z
∗
q
and f(gzeˆUdeˆ) = d (resp., f(gzdˆU edˆ) = d), where eˆ = e−1 (resp., dˆ = d−1). Note that eˆ = e−1
can be offline pre-computed by the verifier, in case it knows the message m before receiving the
signature.
Theorem G.1 Assuming h, f : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}l/{0} ⊆ Z∗q are random oracles where l is the security
parameter (for presentation simplicity, we assume the range of ROs is {0, 1}l rather than {0, 1}l/{0}),
the challenge-divided Schnorr scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen message at-
tacks under the DLP assumption.
Proof. We mainly provide the proof for challenge-divided Schnorr with z = er + dw, the proof for the
case of z = dr + ew is similar.
Given a polynomial-time and successful forger F , i.e., F successfully outputs (after polynomially
many adaptively chosen queries to the signing oracle and random oracles), with non-negligible proba-
bility in polynomial-time, a valid signature on a new message that is different from those queried to the
signing oracle, we build an efficient solver C for the DLP problem, namely, C gets as input a random
element U = g−w in G and outputs the corresponding discrete logarithm w also with non-negligible
probability. For presentation simplicity, we assume the random oracles h, f are identical, namely we
use the unique RO h to handle all RO queries e = h(m) and d = h(a). The algorithm C is presented in
Figure 4.
For the description of C in Figure 4, suppose F makes Q RO queries and R signing oracle queries
(where Q and R are some polynomials in the security parameter l), we have the following proposition:
Proposition G.1 With probability at most (RQ+ R2/2)/(q − 1) (that is negligible), C fails in one of
Step S3 of signature simulations (note that, assuming F never fails at Step S3 in signature simulations,
the signature simulations are perfect). C fails at Step F3 with probability at most (2Q+ 3)2−l.
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Building the DLP solver C from the challenge-divided Schnorr forger F
Setup: The input to C is a random element U = g−w in G, and its goal is to compute w. To this end, C
provides F with a random tape, and runs the forger F as the challenge-divided Schnorr signer of public-key
U .
RO queries: C provides random answers to queries to the random oracle h, under the limitation that if
the same h query is presented more than once, C answers it with the same response as in the first time.
Signature query simulation: Each time F queries the signing oracle for a challenge-divided Schnorr
signature on message mi, 1 ≤ i ≤ R, chosen by F adaptively, where mi denotes the message in the i-th
query, C answers the query as follows (note that C does not know the secret-key w corresponding to the
public-key U = gw):
S1. Chooses zi ∈R Z
∗
q and di ∈R {0, 1}
l ⊆ Z∗q where l is the output length of the RO h. If h(m) has been
defined by previous query to h, then sets ei = h(m), otherwise chooses ei ∈R {0, 1}l and defines
h(m) = ei.
S2. Computes ai = g
zie
−1
i Udie
−1
i .
S3. If h(ai) has been previously defined, C aborts its run and outputs “fail”. Otherwise, sets h(ai) = di.
Recall that, for presentation simplicity, we have assumed f = h.
S4. C responds to F ’s signing query mi with the simulated signature (di, zi).
When F halts, C checks whether the following conditions hold:
F1. F outputs (m, d, z) such that (d, z) is a valid signature on m. That is, d, z are in Z∗q , e = h(m)
a = gze
−1
Ude
−1
, and d = h(a).
F2. m was not queried by F to the signing oracle previously, i.e., m 6= mi for all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ R.
F3. The values h(m) and h(a) were queried from the RO h.
If these three conditions hold, C proceeds to the “repeat experiments” below; in all other cases C halts and
outputs “fail”.
The repeat experiments. C runs F again for a second time, under the same public-key U and using the
same coins for F . There are two cases according to the order of the RO queries of h(m) and h(a):
C1. h(m) posterior to h(a): C rewinds F to the point of making the RO query h(m), responds back a
new independent value e′ ∈R {0, 1}l. All subsequent actions of C (including random answers to
subsequent RO queries) are independent of the first run. If in this repeated run F outputs a valid
signature (d, z′) for the message m, i.e., e′ = h(m), d = h(a) and a = gz
′e′−1Ude
′−1
, C computes
w = (z′e′−1 − ze−1)/(de′−1 − de−1) mod q.
C2. h(a) posterior to h(m): C rewinds F to the point of making the RO query h(a), responds back a
new independent value d′ ∈R {0, 1}l. All subsequent actions of C (including random answers to
subsequent RO queries) are independent of the first run. If in this repeated run F outputs a valid
signature (d′, z′) for the message m, i.e., e = h(m), d′ = h(a) and a = gz
′e−1Ud
′e−1 , C computes
w = (z′ − z)/(d′ − d) mod q.
Figure 4: Reduction from DLP to challenge-divided Schnorr forgeries
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Proof (of Proposition of G.1). It is easy to check that suppose C never fails at Step S3, the signature
simulations by C are of identical distribution with that of real signatures by using the secret-key w.
Next, we limit the upper-bound of Step S3 failure. Note that for each ai generated by C at Step S2,
it is distributed uniformly in G \ 1G. In the RO model, there are two cases for C fails at Step S3:
Case 1. For some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ R, F ever successfully guessed the value ai in one of its Q random
oracle queries. Thus, the probability that C fails in Case 1 is at most RQ/(q − 1).
Case 2. For some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ R, the value ai has ever been generated in dealing with the j-th signing
oracle query, j < i. The probability that C fails in Case 2 is at most C2R/(q−1) ≤ (R
2/2)/(q−1), where
C2R is the combination number of selecting two elements from a set of R elements.
Finally, it is easy to check that C fails at Step F3 with probability at most (2Q+3)2−l. To see this,
first note that there are two possibilities for F to output d = h(a) without making RO query with a:
(1) F directly guesses the value d = h(a), which occurs with probability 2−l. (2) The value d = h(a)
collides with some other values from the RO answers (i.e., h(a) = h(a′) for some a′ queried by F to
RO). As F makes at most Q RO queries, the latter case can occur with probability at most Q2−l.
Thus, with probability at least 1− (Q+1)2−l, F knows a (i.e., queries the RO with a). Note that from
(a, d, z) the value logg
zUd
a is (which should be equal to h(m) = e) is then determined. Conditioned on
this, the probability e = h(m) = logg
zUd
a is 2−l, as e is distributed uniformly over {0, 1}l . Thus, F does
not query h(m) with probability at most (Q+ 1)2−l + (1− (Q+ 1)2−l) · 2−l < (Q+ 2) · 2−l. 
Thus, suppose the forger F succeeds (i.e., outputs a valid signature (d, z) for a new message m
different from those queried) with non-negligible probability in its real attack against the signer of
public-key U , F succeeds in the first run of C in Figure 4 also with non-negligible probability (up
to a gap at most (QR + R2/2)/(q − 1)). Then, with non-negligible probability (with a gap at most
(QR+R2/2)/(q−1)+(2Q+3)2−l to the success probability of F in its real attack), C does the repeated
second run.
For presentation simplicity, we write the signature of challenge-divided Schnorr on a message m as
(m, e = h(m), a, d = h(a), z). Note that given a pair of different signatures on the same m (and a):
{(m, e, a, d, z), (m, e′ , a, d, z′)} that corresponds to Case C1 in Figure 4, or, {(m, e, a, d, z), (m, e, a, d′ , z′)}
that corresponds to Case C2 in Figure 4, the value w computed by C is correct. Thus, to finish the
theorem, what left is to show that conditioned F succeeds in outputting the valid (m, e, a, d, z) in
the first run of C, with non-negligible probability F will also succeed in Case C1 or Case C2 of the
repeated second run. We note that this can be shown by a straightforwardly extended version of the
Pointcheval-Stern forking lemma [53] (that was originally developed to argue the security of digital
signature schemes via the Fiat-Shamir paradigm). For completeness, we reproduce the forking lemma
tailored for signature schemes via the challenge-divided Fiat-Shamir paradigm, referred to as divided
forking lemma.
Suppose F produces, with probability ε′, a valid signature (m, e, a, d, z), within the time bound T
in its real attack against the signer of public-key U , then with probability at least ε = (ε′ − (QR +
R2/2)/(q − 1)− (2Q+3)2−l)/2 F outputs a valid signature (m, e, a, d, z) in the first run of C described
in Figure 4 such that F made both h(m) = e and h(a) = d queries to the RO with the order of h(m)
being posterior to h(a) or the order of h(a) being posterior to h(m). Without loss of generality, we
assume it is the former case, i.e., the RO query h(m) is posterior to h(a) (the analysis of the case of
h(a) being posterior to h(m) is similar). We have the following lemma, from which the theorem is then
established.
Lemma G.1 (divided forking lemma) Suppose F produces, with probability ε, a valid signature
(m, e, a, d, z) within the time bound T in the first run of C such that F made both h(m) = e and h(a) = d
RO queries with the order h(m) being posterior to h(a), then within time T ′ ≤ (2/ε+(ε/4Q−2−l)−1) ·T
and with probability at least 19 , a replay of F outputs a valid signature (m, e
′, a, d, z′) for e′ 6= e.
Proof (of Lemma G.1). The proof of Lemma G.1 is essentially identical to that of Lemma 2 in [53],
which we re-produce here for completeness. We mention that, as in [53], although the divided forking
lemma is presented here w.r.t. the challenge-divided Schnorr’s signature (based on the challenge-divided
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Schnorr’s Σ-protocol for DLP), it can be directly extended and applied to signatures derived from other
challenge-divided Σ-protocols.
Denote by ω the random tape of F , and assume F makes at most Q RO queries Q1, · · · ,QQ (for
presentation simplicity, we assume all RO queries are distinct), and denote by ρ = (ρ1, · · · , ρQ) the
Q RO answers. It is clear a random choice of the random function h (i.e., the RO) corresponds to a
random choice of ρ.
Define S to be the set of (ω, h) such that Fh(ω) outputs a valid signature (m, e, a, d, z) in the first
run of C, such that F made both h(m) and h(a) RO queries with the order of h(m) being posterior to
h(a). That is, Pr[S] = ε. Define Ind(ω, h) to be the index of the RO query h(m), i.e., m = QInd(ω,h).
Define Si be the subset of S such that Ind(ω, h) = i for 1 ≤ i ≤ Q. That is, the set {S1, · · · ,SQ}
is a partition of S. Define I = {i|Pr[Si|S] ≥ 1/2Q}, i.e., Pr[Si|i ∈ I] ≥ ε/2Q. For each i ∈ I,
define by hi the restriction of h to queries of index strictly less than i, they by applying the Splitting
Lemma (Lemma 1, page 12 in [53]), there exists a subset Ωi (of S) such that: (1) for any (ω, h) ∈ Ωi,
Prh′ [(ω, h
′) ∈ Si|h
′
i = hi] ≥ ε/4Q; (2) Pr[Ωi|Si] ≥
1
2 . As all the subsets Si are disjoint, it is calculated
that Prω,h[∃i(ω, h) ∈ Ωi ∩ Si|S] ≥
1
4 (for more details, the reader is referred to [53]).
By the Lemma 3 (page 14) in [53], we get Pr[Ind(ω, h) ∈ I|S] ≥ 12 . Now, run F 2/ε times with
random ω and h, with probability 1− (1 − ε)2/ε ≥ 45 we get one successful pair (ω, h) ∈ S. Denote by
β the index Ind(ω, h) corresponding to the successful pair. We know with probability at least 14 , β ∈ I
and (ω, h) ∈ Sβ ∩Ωβ. Consequently, with probability at least
1
5 , the 2/ε runs have provided a successful
pair (ω, h) ∈ Sβ ∩ Ωβ where β = Ind(ω, h). As Prh′ [(ω, h
′) ∈ Sβ|h
′
β = hβ] ≥ ε/4Q in this case, we get
Prh′ [(ω, h
′) ∈ Sβ ∧ρβ 6= ρ
′
β|h
′
β = hβ] ≥ ε/4Q−2
−l, where ρβ = h(Qβ) and ρ
′
β = h
′(Qβ). Now, we replay
F with fixed ω but randomly chose h′ such that h′β = hβ , for (ε/4Q − 2
−l)−1 times, with probability
at least 35 , we will get another success. That is, after less than 2/ε+ (ε/4Q − 2
−l)−1 repetitions of F ’s
attack, with probability at lease 15 ×
3
5 ≥
1
9 , we have obtained two valid signatures (m, e, a, d, z) and
(m, e′, a, d, z′) for e 6= e′.  
Challenge-divided Schnorr vs. DSS. We note all performance advantages of DSS (recalled in
Appendix G) are essentially preserved with the challenge-divided Schnorr scheme. We also note the
techniques proposed in [47] for improving the performance of DSS in certain scenarios, e.g., signature
batch verification and compression, etc, are also applicable to challenge-divided Schnorr. In addition,
challenge-divided Schnorr has the following advantages over DSS:
• Same or better offline space complexity than DSS (much better than Schnorr scheme for imple-
mentation based Z∗p . Suppose k values of a’s are pre-computed, the offline space complexity of
challenge-divided Schnorr with z = er + dw is 3k|q| (which is the same as that of DSS); But, for
challenge-divided Schnorr with z = dr + ew, the offline space complexity is only 2k|q|.
Note that, for Schnorr signature scheme, suppose G′ = Z∗p (where p is typically of 1024 bits while
q is of 160 bits) and the signer pre-computes k values of a, then in Schnorr’s signature scheme the
space complexity (of storing pre-computed values) is (|p|+ |q|)k.
• More efficient signature generation in total. To compute the value s in the DSS-signature (recalled
in Appendix G), the signer of DSS performs 1 modular inverse (i.e., rˆ = r−1) and 2 modular
multiplications in total. In comparison, to compute the value z in the challenge-divided Schnorr
signature, the signer only performs 2 modular multiplications in total (without performing the
modular inverse operation). We remark that modular inverse is a relatively expensive operation
(which is typically performed by the Euclid algorithm), and is thus much preferable to dispense
with (particularly for smart-card-based deployment).
• More efficient offline pre-computation. Besides the same other pre-computations, the signer of
DSS needs to perform 1 modular inverse r−1 and 2 modular multiplications for computing dwr−1,
but the signer of challenge-divided Schnorr needs to offline perform only 1 modular multiplication
dw or dr.
• More efficient online signature verification (for the case of z = er + dw). For verifying a DSS-
signature (d, s), the verifier has to compute sˆ = s−1 online (which is a relatively expensive opera-
tion), as the value s is known to the verifier only when the signature comes to it. In comparison,
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for verification of challenge-divided Schnorr with z = er + dw, the verifier only needs to compute
the inverse eˆ = e−1 where e = h(m). In case the verifier learns the message to be signed prior to
receiving the signature from the signer (which is quite common in certain scenarios), the values
e and e−1 can both be offline pre-computed by the verifier of challenge-divided Schnorr. For
challenge-divided Schnorr with z = dr + ew, signature verification is of the same computational
complexity as that of DSS.
• Provable security in the random oracle model. We show that, assuming both h and f are random
oracles, the challenge-divided Schnorr scheme is existentially unforgeable against adaptive chosen
message attacks [29] under the DLP assumption in the RO model.
Challenge-divided Schnorr vs. Schnorr. For implementations of challenge-divided Schnorr and
Schnorr based over order q subgroups of Z∗p , where p is typically of 1024 bits and q is of about 160
bits, similar to DSS in this case, challenge-divided Schnorr enjoys much better offline space efficiency
than Schnorr. However, for elliptic curve based implementations of both challenge-divided Schnorr and
Schnorr, such offline space efficiency advantage disappears. As mentioned, the introduction of challenge-
divided Schnorr is mainly to introduce the divided forking lemma to be used in the analysis of (s)OAKE
in the CK-framework.
G.2 Casting (s)OAKE in Terms of Online Efficient and Strongly Secure HDR
Signatures
Informally speaking, a HDR signature scheme is an interactive signature scheme between two parties in
the public-key model. The two parties generate the same signature, which is actually a hashed value of
the DH-secret shared between the two parties, with the dual roles of signer and challenger: each party
generates the signature with private values of its static secret-key and the secret DH-exponent with
respect to its peer’s DH-component and public-key as the challenges. With a HDR signature, we are
only interested to ensure verifiability of the signature by the two intended parties, and thus we make
no assumptions or requirements regarding the transferability or verifiability of the signature by a third
party. Roughly speaking, a HDR signature scheme is secure if the signature cannot be generated by
any other parties other than the two intended (honest) parties.
Definition G.2 ((s)OAKE-HDR signature schemes) Let Aˆ, Bˆ be two parties with public-keys
A = ga, B = gb, respectively. Let mAˆ, mBˆ be two messages. The OAKE-HDR, sOAKE-HDR signa-
tures of Bˆ on messages (mAˆ,mBˆ , Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y ) are defined as a vector of values (the signatures of
Aˆ are defined straightforwardly):
OAKE-HDR. {Aˆ, A,mAˆ,mBˆ,X, Y,HSIG
OAKE
Aˆ,Bˆ
(mAˆ,mBˆ ,X, Y ) = HK(A
ycXbd+ye)}, where X = gx,
Y = gy are chosen by Aˆ, Bˆ respectively as the random challenge and response, x, y ∈R Z
∗
q ,
c = h(mAˆ, Aˆ, A, Y ), d = h(mBˆ , Bˆ, B,X) and e = h(X,Y ).
Another form of OAKE-HDR is to set c = h(Aˆ, A, Y ), d = h(Bˆ, B,X) and e = h(mAˆ,mBˆ ,X, Y ).
Both of these two versions are secure.
sOAKE-HDR. {Aˆ, A,mAˆ,mBˆ ,X, Y,HSIG
sOAKE
Aˆ,Bˆ
(mAˆ,mBˆ,X, Y ) = HK(A
ycXbd+ye)}, where c = d =
1, e = h(mAˆ,mBˆ , Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y ).
Note that the online efficiency of (s)OAKE-HDR can be only one exponentiation for each player. In
comparison, each player of HMQV-HDR performs about 1.3 online exponentiations. For presentation
simplicity, in the above HDR signature description we assume the CA in the underlying PKI will check
the membership G \ 1G of registered public-keys, and each player checks the membership G \ 1G of its
peer’s DH-component. These subgroup tests may not be necessary for the security of HDR in general,
assuming no ephemeral private state is exposed, and thus can be relaxed in some scenarios (see [37, 45]
for more details).
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(s)OAKE in a nutshell. Actually, the above OAKE-HDR/sOAKE-HDR can be viewed as a
general structure of the (s)OAKE protocols. Specifically, OAKE and sOAKE are instantiated with
OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR respectively, with the special mAˆ and mBˆ that are set to be the empty
string. In general, mAˆ (resp., mBˆ) can include some values sent to Aˆ (resp., Bˆ) from Bˆ (resp., Aˆ),
which does not affect the pre-computability of (s)OAKE. In particular, in practice with pre-computed
and reused DH-components, mAˆ (resp., mBˆ) can include a random nonce generated and sent by Bˆ
(resp., Aˆ).
In the following, we show the security of OAKE-HDR, sOAKE-HDR with off-line pre-computed
DH-exponents, DH-components, and the values Ayc or Bxd (that may be potentially exposed to the
forger even prior to the session involving these pre-computed values), on which the security of OAKE
and sOAKE in the CK-framework will be based. In particular, we show that our OAKE-HDR and
sOAKE-HDR satisfy a stronger security definition (than the definition given in [37]) in accordance with
Definition 5.2.
On the strong security of HDR. The strong security of our definition for HDR lies in that:
• We assume (y, Y,Acy) are off-line pre-computed, and the forger can get them prior to the session
run involving them.
This particularly renders stronger capability to the attacker to perform colliding (birthday) attacks
against the hash function h (that is of length |q|/2 for HMQV). To deal with this subtlety, the
actual HMQV implementation needs some changes in practice (to be clarified later).
• In the forging game defined in Figure 2, the successful forgery requires that the whole vector
(Aˆ, A,m1,m0,X0, Y0) did not appear in any of the responses of Bˆ to F ’s queries. The definition
for the security of HCR in [37] only requires that the pair (Y0,m0) did not appear in responses
from the signer. As we shall see, the HMQV-HDR scheme may not be strongly secure in general.
OAKE-HDR vs. HMQV-HDR. In [37], the HMQV-HDR (of Bˆ) is defined to be {X,Y,
DSIGHMQV
Aˆ,Bˆ
(mAˆ,mBˆ ,X, Y ) = HK((XA
d)y+be)}, where d = h(mAˆ,X), e = h(mBˆ , Y ). For building
HMQV with HMQV-HDR, mBˆ (resp., mAˆ) is set to be its peer’s identity Aˆ (resp., Bˆ). The underlying
HMQV-XCR-signature is defined to be Xy+be, where e = h(mBˆ , Y ). The following are some brief
comparisons between OAKE-HDR and HMQV-HDR:
• One notable advantageous feature of OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR is the online efficiency.
Specifically, the online efficiency of OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR, for each player, can be only
one exponentiation. In comparison, each player of HMQV-HDR performs about 1.3 online expo-
nentiations.
• As we shall see, the OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR are strongly secure in accordance with Def-
inition 5.2. We note that the HMQV-XCR underlying HMQV-HDR is not strongly secure. For
example, to forge a HMQV-XCR signature (X,Y, σ = Xb+ey) on message m, where e = h(m,Y ),
the forger can first query the signer with (m,X ′ = X2), gets back (X ′, Y, σ′ = X ′b+ey), and then
outputs (X,Y, σ = σ′
1
2 ) as the XCR signature on m. Note that the triple (X,Y, σ) did not appear
in any one of the responses from the HMQV-XCR signer Bˆ. We note that one way to remedy this
security vulnerability of HMQV-XCR is to commit X also to e by defining e = h(m,X, Y ).
• The security of OAKE-HDR/sOAKE-HDR against uncorrupted players other than the signer
itself, with offline pre-computed (y, Y,Acy) that can be exposable to the adversary even prior to
the session involving (y, Y,Acy), is based on the gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) assumption.
The security of HMQV-HDR against uncorrupted players other than the signer itself, with offline
pre-computed DH-component Y , is based on both the GDH assumption and the non-standard
KEA assumption [17], even if the pre-computed DH-exponent y is not exposable and only the
pre-computed DH-component Y is exposable. Furthermore, for robust security of HMQV-HDR
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with pre-computed DH-components, when the number of messages in the system is large, HMQV-
HDR needs to make the following modifications [37]: (1) Increase the output length, i.e., l, of the
hash function h, e.g., from |q|/2 to |q|, which may bring negative impact on the performance of
HMQV. (2) Add random nonces into the input of d and e, or, put the message to be signed also
into HK , which may increase the system complexity.
• The generation of the sOAKE-HDR signature uses minimal (i.e., only one) random oracle (in
computing the value of e).
• The HMQV-HDR signature is actually an XCR signature w.r.t. the challenge XAd. In compar-
ison, OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR in general cannot be viewed as a structure of XCR w.r.t.
some challenge f(X,A) for some function f .
• As we shall see, the special protocol structure of OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR also much sim-
plifies, in certain scenarios, the security analysis of OAKE and sOAKE in the CK-framework.
Next, we show the strong security of OAKE-HDR, sOAKE-HDR under the Gap Diffie-Hellman
(GDH) assumption in the random oracle model.
Theorem G.2 Under the GDH assumption, OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR signatures of Bˆ, with
offline pre-computed and exposable (y, Y,Acy), are strongly secure in the random oracle model, with
respect to any uncorrupted player other than the signer Bˆ itself even if the forger is given the private
keys of all uncorrupted players in the system other than b of Bˆ
Proof (of Theorem G.2). Given an efficient and successful forger F against OAKE-HDR or sOAKE-
HDR, i.e., F wins the forgery game in Figure 2 with respect to some uncorrupted player Aˆ 6= Bˆ with
non-negligible probability, we build an efficient solver C for GDH problem also with non-negligible
probability. The algorithm C for OAKE-HDR is presented in Figure 3 (page 12), and the algorithm C
for sOAKE-HDR is presented in Figure 5 (page 38).
For the description of C in Figure 3, suppose F makes Qh RO queries to h, QH queries to HK , Qs
signing oracle queries, where Qh, QH , Qs are polynomial in the security parameter l (i.e., the output
length of h). We have the following observations:
• The signature simulation at steps S1-S3 is perfect.
• Now, suppose F outputs a successful forgery (Aˆ, A,m1,m0,X0, Y0, r0), which particularly implies
that r0 should be HK(σ0), where σ0 = A
y0c0Xbd0+y0e00 , X0 = U , Y0 = g
y0 , c0 = h(m1, Aˆ, A, Y0),
d0 = h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0) and e0 = h(X0, Y0). We investigate the probability that C aborts at step
F3. We have the following observations:
– With probability at most 1
2l−1
+ 2−k + QH/2
k, F can succeed with undefined any one of
{c0, d0, e0}. Here,
1
2l−1
is the probability that F guesses σ0 with undefined c0 or d0 or e0,
2−k is the probability that F simply guesses the value r0, and QH/2
k is the probability
upper-bound that r0 = HK(σ0) collides with some HK-answers.
– With defined c0 and d0 and e0, there are two cases for F to succeed without queryingHK(σ0):
Case-1. F simply guesses the value r0. This probability is 2
−k.
Case-2. r0 is the value r set by C at one of S3.1 steps, where r is supposed to be HK(σ)
w.r.t. a stored vector (Zˆ, Z,mZˆ ,mBˆ ,X, y, Y, Z
cy, r). Recall that for the value r set at
step S3.1, C does not know σ (as it does not know b), and thus in this case both C
and F may not make the RO-query HK(σ0) = HK(σ). In this case, by the birthday
paradox with probability at least 1−Q2H/2
−k, σ0 = σ, i.e., A
c0y0Xd0b+e0y00 = Z
cyXdb+ey,
where c = h(mZˆ , Zˆ, Z, Y ), d = h(mBˆ , Bˆ, B,X), e = h(X,Y ), c0 = h(m1, Aˆ, A, Y0), d0 =
h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0), e0 = h(X0, Y0), and (m0,m1, Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X0, Y0) 6= (mAˆ,mBˆ , Zˆ, Z, Bˆ,B,X, Y ).
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By the NMJPOK and TBSS properties of OAKE, for any value σ ∈ G \ 1G and any
(m1,m0, Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X0, Y0), the probability Pr[A
c0y0Xd0b+e0y00 = σ] ≤
1
2l−1
, where X0 is
the given random element in G\1G, Aˆ and Bˆ are uncorrupted players. This is true, even
if the public-key A (resp., B) is removed from c0 (resp., d0), as the public-keys A and
B are generated by the uncorrupted players Aˆ and Bˆ independently at random. Then,
by straightforward calculation, we can get that F succeeds in Case-2 with probability at
most O(
Q2
h
2l−1
+
Qs+Q2H
2k
).
Note: To rule out the possibility of Case-2, the analysis of HMQV-HCR requires the
KEA assumption [17]. Furthermore, to resist to birthday attacks in Case-2, some mod-
ifications of HMQV are recommended in [37]: (1) increase the output length, i.e., l, of
h, e.g., from |q|/2 to |q|. (2) Add random and fresh nonces (which cannot be offline
pre-computed) to the input of h, or put the messages to be signed mAˆ,mBˆ into the
input of HK .
– With probability at most 1
2l−1
, the queryHK(σ0) is prior to any one of the queries {c0, d0, e0}.
• It is easy to check that, in case the forger F successfully outputs another different forge satisfying
the conditions F1-F3 in the repeat experiment C1 or C2, the output of C is the correct value of
CDH(X0, B).
The similar observations can be easily checked for the algorithm C for sOAKE-HDR described in Figure
5. Putting all together, we have that: suppose for some uncorrupted player Aˆ 6= Bˆ, the forger F
provides, with non-negligible probability, a successful forgery w.r.t. Aˆ in its real interactions with the
signer of OAKE-HDR/sOAKE-HDR, then with also non-negligible probability (up to a negligible gap
specified by the above observations) F succeeds under the run of C. Then, by applying the forking
lemma, specifically, the divided forking lemma (Lemma G.1) for OAKE-HDR and the normal forking
lemma of [53] for sOAKE-HDR, the theorem is established. 
On the role of putting players’ public-keys into the inputs of c, d for OAKE-HDR and
e for sOAKE-HDR. We remark that the players’ public-keys in the inputs of c, d, e for OAKE-
HDR/sOAKE-HDR actually play no role in the above security analysis. That is, the above secu-
rity analysis is actually with respect to a (public-key free) variant of OAKE-HDR/sOAKE-HDR, with
public-keys are removed from the inputs of c, d, e. Recall that, players’ public-keys are only used
for arguing the TBSS property of OAKE-HDR/sOAKE-HDR. Specifically, for any value σ ∈ G \ 1G
and any (m1,m0, Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X0, Y0), the probability Pr[σ0 = A
c0y0Xd0b+e0y00 = σ] ≤
1
2l−1
, where
c0 = h(m1, Aˆ, A, Y0), d0 = h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0), e0 = h(X0, Y0) and the probability is taken over only
the choice of the random function h. But, as we assume Aˆ and Bˆ are both uncorrupted players,
their public-keys are generated independently at random. Also, the value X0 is the given random DH-
component (not generated by the attacker). To affect the distribution of σ0, the only freedom of the
attacker is to maliciously choose (Y0,m0,m1), which however does not change the distribution of σ0. In
particular, for any value σ ∈ G \ 1G and for any (Y0,m0,m1) chosen maliciously by the attacker w.r.t.
the fixed (Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X0), it still holds that Pr[σ0 = σ] ≤
1
2l−1
.
Security of OAKE-HDR/sOAKE-HDR against the signer itself. The above security analy-
sis considers the security of OAKE-HDR/sOAKE-HDR against any other uncorrupted players other than
the signer itself, i.e., the (in)feasibility of outputting a successful forgery (m1,m0, Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X0, Y0, r0)
where Aˆ is an uncorrupted player and Aˆ 6= Bˆ. But, the forger F may also be against the signer Bˆ itself.
That is, F may output a successful forgery of the form: (m1,m0, Bˆ, B, Bˆ,B,X0, Y0, r0) (i.e., Aˆ = Bˆ).
Here, we further investigate the feasibility of successful forgeries of this form. We distinguish two cases:
(1) Y0 = X0, i.e., the successful forgery is of the form (m1,m0, Bˆ, B, Bˆ,B,X0,X0, r0). For this case,
we show OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR are still secure under the traditional CDH assumption (not
the stronger GDH assumption) in the RO model; (2) Y0 6= X0. For this case, we show OAKE-HDR
and sOAKE-HDR are secure under the GDH assumption, and additionally the KEA assumption, in the
RO model. We remark that the KEA assumption is only used to rule out the feasibility of successful
forgeries in this case of Y0 6= X0 and Aˆ = Bˆ.
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Building the CDH solver C from the sOAKE-HDR forger F
Setup: C does the same as it does for the forger F against OAKE-HDR.
Signature query simulation: Each time F queries Bˆ for a signature on values (Zˆ, Z,m
Bˆ
,m
Aˆ
), C answers
the query for Bˆ as follows (note that C does not know b):
S1. C generates y ∈R Z∗q , Y = g
y and Zy. Again, (y, Y, Zy) can be pre-computed by C and leaked to F prior
to the session. Then, C responds (y, Y = gy, Zy) to F , and stores the vector (Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, y, Y, Ay) as
an “incomplete session”.
S2. F presents C with (Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, Y ), and a challenge X .
S3. Bˆ checks that X ∈ G \ 1G (if not, it aborts) and that (Zˆ, Z,mZˆ ,mBˆ, Y ) is in one of its incomplete
sessions (if not, it ignores the query). C checks for every value σ ∈ G \ 1G previously used by F as
input to HK whether σ = Z
yXb+ye, where e = h(m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, Zˆ, Z, Bˆ, B,X, Y ) (in case of undefined e,
C defines it with the RO h). It does so using the DDH-oracle O, specifically, by checking whether
CDH(X,B) = (σ/ZyXye). If the answer is positive, then C sets r to the already determined value of
HK(σ).
S3.1. In any other cases, r is set to be a random value in {0, 1}k, where k is the output length of
HK . Note that, in this case, C does not know σ = ZyXb+ey, as it does not know b, which also
implies that C does not make (actually realize) the RO-query HK(σ) even if the value σ has been
well-defined (with predetermined d and e) and known to F .
Finally, C marks the vector (Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, X, y, Y, Zy) as a “complete session”, stores
(Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, X, y, Y, Zy, r) and responds (Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, X, Y, r) to F .
RO queries: C provides random answers to queries to the random oracles h and HK (made by F), under
the limitation that if the same RO-query is presented more than once, C answers it with the same response as
in the first time. But, for each new query σ to HK , C checks whether σ = ZyXb+ey for any one of the stored
vectors (Zˆ, Z,m
Zˆ
,m
Bˆ
, X, y, Y, Zy, r) (as before, this check is done using the DDH-oracle). If equality holds
then the corresponding r is returned as the predefined HK(σ), otherwise a random r is returned.
Upon F ’s termination. When F halts, C checks whether the following conditions hold:
F1. F outputs a valid HDR-signature (Aˆ, A,m1,m0, X0, Y0, r0), where Aˆ 6= Bˆ is an uncorrupted player. In
particular, it implies that r0 should be HK(σ0), where σ0 = A
y0Xb+y0e00 , Y0 = g
y0 (chosen by F), and
e0 = h(m1,m0, Aˆ, A, Bˆ, B,X0Y0).
F2. (Aˆ, A,m1,m0, X0, Y0) did not appear in any of the above responses of the simulated sOAKE-HDR sig-
natures.
F3. The value e0 = h(m1,m0, Aˆ, A, Bˆ, B,X0Y0) was queried from the RO h, and the value HK(σ0) was
queried from HK being posterior to the query e0. Otherwise, C aborts.
If these three conditions hold, C proceeds to the “repeat experiment” below, else it aborts.
The repeat experiment. C runs F again for a second time, under the same input (B,X0) and using the
same coins for F . C rewinds F to the point of making the RO query h(m1,m0, Aˆ, A, Bˆ, B,X0Y0), responds
back a new independent value e′0 ∈R {0, 1}
l. All subsequent actions of C (including random answers to
subsequent RO queries) are independent of the first run. If in this repeated run F outputs a successful forgery
(Aˆ′, A′,m′1,m0, X0, Y0, r
′
0) satisfying the conditions F1-F3 (otherwise, C aborts), which particularly implies
that r′0 = HK(σ
′
0), σ
′
0 = A
′y0X
b+y0e
′
0
0 , C computes CDH(X0, Y0) = g
x0y0 = [(σ0/Y
a
0 )/(σ
′
0/Y
a′
0 )]
(e0−e
′
0
)−1 ,
where a and a′ are the private keys of the uncorrupted Aˆ and Aˆ′ (different from Bˆ, which are assumed
to be known to C). Note that (Aˆ′, A′,m′1) need not necessarily to equal (Aˆ, A,m1). Finally, C computes
CDH(U, V ) = CDH(X0, B) = σ0/((g
x0y0)e0 · Y a0 ).
Figure 5: Reduction from GDH to sOAKE-HDR forgeries
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Corollary G.1 Under the computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) assumption, (public-key free) OAKE-
HDR and sOAKE-HDR signatures of Bˆ, with offline pre-computed and exposable (y, Y,Acy), are strongly
secure in the random oracle model, with respect to the signer Bˆ itself with Y0 = X0.
Proof. This case implies that the forger F can output, with non-negligible probability, a successful
forgery of the form: (m1,m0, Bˆ, B, Bˆ,B,X0,X0, r0), where r0 = HK(σ0), σ0 = B
c0x0Xd0b+e0x00 =
(Xc00 X
d0
0 )
bXe0x00 , c0 = h(m1, Bˆ, B,X0), d0 = h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0), e0 = h(X0,X0) for OAKE-HDR (for
sOAKE-HDR, c0 = d0 = 1 and e0 = h(m1,m0, Bˆ, B, Bˆ,B,X0,X0)). Note that from σ0 and Bˆ’s secret-
key b, we can compute Xx00 . But, as mentioned, the hardness of computing X
x from random X is
equivalent to that of the CDH problem [42, 46].
With the above observations, we modify the algorithm C depicted in Figure 3 and Figure 5 as follows:
• C knows (sets) also the private key b for Bˆ. By knowing the private key b, C dispenses with the
DDH-oracle in order to make the answers to RO-queries to be consistent.
• After F outputs a successful forgery of the form (m1,m0, Bˆ, B, Bˆ,B,X0,X0, r0), satisfying the
conditions F1-F3, C simply computes out Xx00 from σ0 and the private-key b. Note that C does
not need to perform the rewinding experiments at all in this case.
The analysis show that, in case of successful forgery against the signer itself with Y0 = X0, the
security not only is based on the weaker hardness assumption (say, the CDH assumption rather than
the GDH assumption), but also of tighter security reduction (to the underlying hardness assumption,
say the CDH assumption here). 
Now we consider the case of Y0 6= X0. As mentioned, it is the only place we need to additionally
use the KEA assumption.
Definition G.3 [Knowledge-of-Exponent Assumption (KEA)] Let G be a cyclic group of prime order
q generated by an element g, and consider algorithms that on input a triple (g,C = gc, z) output a
pair (Y,Z) ∈ G2, where c is taken uniformly at random from Z∗q and z ∈ {0, 1}
∗ is an arbitrary string
that is generated independently of C. Such an algorithm A is said to be a KEA algorithm if with
non-negligible probability (over the choice of g, c and A’s random coins) A(g, gc, z) outputs (Y,Z) ∈ G2
such that Z = Y c. Here, C = gc is the random challenge to the KEA algorithm A, and z captures the
auxiliary input of A that is independent of the challenge C.
We say that the KEA assumption holds over G, if for every probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT)
KEA algorithm A for G there exists another efficient algorithm K, referred to as the KEA-extractor,
for which the following property holds except for a negligible probability: let (g, gc, z) be an input to A
and ρ a vector of random coins for A on which A outputs (Y,Z = Y c), then, on the same inputs and
random coins, K(g,C, z, ρ) outputs the triple (Y,Z = Y c, y) where Y = gy.
Corollary G.2 Under the GDH assumption, and additionally the KEA assumption, (public-key free)
OAKE-HDR and sOAKE-HDR signatures of Bˆ, with offline pre-computed and exposable (y, Y,Acy), are
strongly secure in the random oracle model, with respect to the signer Bˆ itself with Y0 6= X0.
Proof. The proof of Corollary G.2 follows the same outline of that of Theorem G.2. We highlight the
main differences, and how the KEA assumption comes into force in the security analysis. The analysis
is mainly w.r.t. OAKE-HDR (the similar, and actually simpler, hold also for sOAKE-HDR).
The main difference between the proof of Corollary G.2 and that of Theorem G.2 is that, here, the
forger outputs with non-negligible probability a successful forgery of the form: (m1,m0, Bˆ, B, Bˆ,B,X0,
Y0, r0), where r0 = HK(σ0), σ0 = B
c0y0Xd0b+e0y00 , c0 = h(m1, Bˆ, B, Y0), d0 = h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0), e0 =
h(X0, Y0). The key point is that, by performing the rewinding experiments, we cannot directly output
the CDH(B,X0), as we do not know the private key b of Bˆ (recall that we are going to compute
CDH(B,X0) by running the forger F). Note that in the security analysis of Theorem G.2, we heavily
relied on the fact that we know the private key of any uncorrupted player other than the signer itself.
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We modify the algorithm C depicted in Figure 3 and Figure 5 as follows: the actions of C remain
unchanged until the rewinding experiments; C performs the rewinding experiments according to the
order of the RO-queries c0, d0, e0.
d0 posterior to c0, e0. In this case, by rewindingF to the point of making the query d0 = h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0),
and redefines h(m0, Bˆ, B,X0) to be a new independent d
′
0, C will get σ
′
0 = B
c0y0X
d′0b+e0y0
0 . Then,
from σ0 and σ
′
0, C gets that CDH(B,X0) = (σ/σ
′
0)
(d0−d′0)
−1
. Note that, in this case, C does not
rely on the KEA assumption for breaking the CDH assumption (but still with the DDH-oracle).
c0 posterior to d0, e0. In this case, by rewindingF to the point of making the query c0 = h(m1, Bˆ, B, Y0),
and redefines h(m1, Bˆ, B, Y0) to be a new independent c
′
0, C will get σ
′
0 = B
c′0y0Xd0b+e0y00 . Then,
from σ0 and σ
′
0, C gets CDH(B,Y0) = B
y0 = (σ/σ′0)
(c0−c′0)
−1
. That is, given B, C can output
(Y0, B
y0). By the KEA assumption, it implies that F knows y0 (which can be derived from the
internal state of F). More formally, there exists an algorithm that, given B and X0 and the ran-
dom coins of C and F can successfully output y0. Now, with the knowledge of y0, CDH(B,X0)
can be derived from σ0 (or σ
′
0).
e0 posterior to c0, d0. In this case, by rewinding F to the point of making the query e0 = h(X0, Y0),
and redefines h(X0, Y0) to be a new independent e
′
0, C will get σ
′
0 = B
c0y0X
d0b+e′0y0
0 . Then, from
σ0 and σ
′
0, C gets CDH(X0, Y0) = X
y0
0 = (σ/σ
′
0)
(e0−e′0)
−1
. Then, by the KEA assumption, the
knowledge of y0 can be derived, with which CDH(X0, B) can then be computed from either σ0
or σ′0. 
G.2.1 Extension to Robust (s)OAKE-HDR Signatures
In this section, we show that the security analysis of (s)OAKE-HDR signatures can be extended to
robust (s)OAKE-HDR signatures. We first re-describe the robust (s)OAKE-HDR signatures:
Definition G.4 (robust (s)OAKE-HDR signatures) Let Aˆ,Bˆ be two parties with public-keys A =
ga, B = gb, respectively. Let mAˆ, mBˆ be two messages. The robust (s)OAKE-HDR signatures of Bˆ on
messages (mAˆ,mBˆ , Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y ) are defined as a vector of values (the signatures of Aˆ are defined
similarly):
Robust OAKE-HDR. {Aˆ, A,mAˆ,mBˆ ,X, Y,HSIG
OAKE
Aˆ,Bˆ
(mAˆ,mBˆ ,X, Y ) = HK(A
b+ycXbd+ye)}, where
X = gx, Y = gy are chosen by Aˆ, Bˆ respectively as the random challenge and response, x, y ∈R Z
∗
q ,
c = h(mAˆ, Aˆ, A, Y ), d = h(mBˆ , Bˆ, B,X) and e = h(X,Y ).
Robust sOAKE-HDR. {Aˆ, A,mAˆ,mBˆ ,X, Y,HSIG
sOAKE
Aˆ,Bˆ
(mAˆ,mBˆ ,X, Y ) = HK(A
b+ycXbd+ye)}, where
c = d = 1, e = h(mAˆ,mBˆ , Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y ).
For the security analysis of the robust (s)OAKE variant, the exposed values Acy and Bdx for (s)OAKE
are changed to be Ab+cy and Ba+dx.
Security analysis extension for the case of Aˆ 6= Bˆ. We note that the proof of Theorem G.2
can be straightforwardly extended to robust (s)OAKE-HDR signatures, by the following observations:
• In Step S3 and for answering RO queries, to ensure the consistency of RO queries with each σ
previously queried by F to the RO HK , the challenger C checks whether σ = Z
b+cyXbd+ye by
checking whether CDH(B,XdZ) = σ/ZcyXye = ZbXdb = (XdZ)b via its DDH oracle.
• The repeat experiments can still go through because that: Bˆ 6= Aˆ, Aˆ is an uncorrupted player
and the challenger knows the secret-key a. Thus the value Ab+cy = (BY c)a can be removed from
σ.
40
Security analysis extension for the case of Aˆ = Bˆ and X = Y . The security analysis of robust
(s)OAKE-HDR signatures for this case is essentially the same as in the analysis of Corollary G.1.
Security analysis extension for the case of Aˆ = Bˆ and X 6= Y . The key differences, in
comparison with the proof of Corollary G.2, are that:
• For robust OAKE-HDR signature, the output of the challenger C during the rewinding experiments
is CDH(B,X0) for the case of d0 posterior to c0, e0, and is CDH(X
d0
0 B,B) = X
bd0
0 B
b in the rest
two cases.
• For robust sOAKE-HDR signature, as c = d = 1, the output of the challenger C during the
rewinding experiments is always CDH(Xd00 B,B) = X
bd0
0 B
b.
But, either case contradicts the CDH assumption, by the following proposition:
Proposition G.2 Given random elements B = gb,X = gx ∈ G \ 1G, where b, x are taken indepen-
dently at random from Z∗q , the hardness of computing CDH(B,X) is equivalent to that of computing
CDH(XdB,B) = (XdB)b, where d = h(Bˆ, B,X).
Proof (of Proposition G.2). First recall that the hardness of computing Bb from random B = gb is
equivalent to that of the CDH problem [42, 46]. Thus, the ability of computing CDH(B,X) (given
(B,X)) is equivalent to the ability of computing Bb (given B only), which then implies the ability of
computing CDH(XdB,B) = XbdBb.
Suppose there exists an efficient algorithm A˜ that can compute CDH(Xd, B) = XdbBb (from B and
X) with non-negligible probability, then there exists another efficient algorithm B˜ that can breaks the
CDH assumption with also non-negligible probability. The input of B˜ is a random element B ∈ G \ 1G,
and its goal is to break the CDH assumption by computing CDH(B,B) = Bb. Towards this goal, B˜
generatesX = gx where x is taken uniformly at random from Z∗q , and then runs A˜ on input (B,X). After
getting CDH(XdB) = XdbBb = BxdBb from the output of A˜, B˜ computes Bb = CDH(XdB,B)/Bxd.
According to the above discussions, given random elements (B,X), under the CDH assumption no
efficient algorithm can compute either CHD(B,X) or CDH(XdB,B) with non-negligible probability.

In addition, in view of the fact that c = d = 1 for robust sOAKE-HDR signature, there is another
analysis method for robust sOAKE-HDR signature. Specifically, given random elements U, V , the
challenger C sets (in the Setup procedure) that: B = V and X0 = (U/B) (rather than X0 = U). Note
that, in this case, the output of the challenger C during the rewinding experiments is CDH(Xd00 B,B) =
Xb0B
b = U
b
Bb
Bb = U b = CDH(U,B), which directly violates the GDH assumption.
G.3 Analysis of (s)OAKE with Offline Pre-Computation in the CK-Framework
Brief description of the CK-framework. In the CK-framework for a DHKE protocol, a CMIM
adversary A controls all the communication channels among concurrent session runs of the KE protocol.
In addition, A is allowed access to secret information via the following three types of queries: (1)
state-reveal queries for ongoing incomplete sessions; (2) session-key queries for completed sessions; (3)
corruption queries upon which all information in the memory of the corrupted parties will be leaked to
A. A session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) is called exposed, if it or its matching session (Bˆ, Aˆ, Y,X) suffers from any of
these three queries.
The session-key security (SK-security) within the CK-framework is captured as follows: for any
complete session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) adaptively selected by A, referred to as the test session, as long as it is
unexposed it holds with overwhelming probability that (1) the session-key outputs of the test session
and its matching session are identical; (2) A cannot distinguish the session-key output of the test session
from a random value. At a high level, the SK-security essentially says that a party that completes a
session has the following guarantees [14]: (1) if the peer to the session is uncorrupted then the session-
key is unknown to anyone except this peer; (2) if the unexposed peer completes a matching session then
the two parties have the same shared key.
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Next, we present the analysis of OAKE and sOAKE protocols in the CK-framework with pre-
specified peers, with offline pre-computed and exposable DH-exponents, DH-components, and DH-secrets
derived from one’s DH-component and its peer’s public-key (say, Acy and Bdx) which may be exposed
to the adversary prior to the session involving these pre-computed values. The analysis can also be
straightforwardly extended to that of the robust (s)OAKE variant, where the exposed value Acy and
Bdx are changed to be Ab+cy and Ba+dx.
Using the terminology of HDR signatures, a session of OAKE (resp., sOAKE), for the basic protocol
version without explicit mutual identifications and key confirmations, between two parties Aˆ and Bˆ con-
sists of a basic Diffie-Hellman exchange of DH-components X = gx and Y = gy; And the session-key K
is then computed as the corresponding HDR-signatures, specifically, K = HSIGOAKE
Aˆ,Bˆ
(mAˆ,mBˆ,X, Y )
for OAKE and (resp., K = HSIGsOAKE
Aˆ,Bˆ
(mAˆ,mBˆ ,X, Y ) for sOAKE), where mAˆ and mBˆ are the empty
string for both OAKE and sOAKE.
During a session of (s)OAKE within the CK-framework, with offline pre-computation, a party can be
activated with three types of activations (for presentation simplicity, we assume Aˆ denotes the identity
of the party being activated and Bˆ the identity of the intended peer to the session):
Initiate(Aˆ, Bˆ) (i.e., Aˆ is activated as the initiator): Aˆ generates a value X = gx, x ∈R Z
∗
q , creates a
local session of the protocol which it identifies as (the incomplete) session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X), and outputs
the DH-component X as its outgoing message.
Here (X,x,Bdx), where d = h(Bˆ, B,X) for OAKE or d = 1 for sOAKE can be offline pre-computed
by Aˆ, which may be exposed to the adversary prior to the session involving them.
Respond(Aˆ, Bˆ, Y ) (i.e., Aˆ is activated as the responder): Aˆ checks Y ∈ G \ 1G, if so it generates a
value X = gx, x ∈R Z
∗
q , outputs X, computes the session-key and then completes the session
(Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ).
Again, (X,x,Bdx) can be offline pre-computed by Aˆ, which may be exposed to the adversary prior
to the session involving them.
Complete(Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) (i.e., the initiator Aˆ receives Y from the responder peer Bˆ): Aˆ checks that
Y ∈ G \ 1G and that it has an open session with identifier (Aˆ, Bˆ,X). If any of these conditions
fails Aˆ ignores the activation, otherwise it computes the session-key and completes the session
(Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ).
With the above notation, it is ensured that if (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) is a complete session at Aˆ, then its
matching session (if it exists) is unique, which is (Bˆ, Aˆ, Y,X) owned by the player Bˆ. In the following
analysis, we specify that the values, exposable to the adversary via session-state query (against an
incomplete session), include the DH-component and DH-exponent and the DH-secret of one’s DH-
component and its peer’s public-key, e.g., (Y, y,Acy).
Theorem G.3 Under the GDH assumption in the RO model, the OAKE and sOAKE protocols (ac-
tually, the variants with public-keys removed from the inputs of c, d, e), with offline pre-computed DH-
components, DH-exponents, and the DH-secrets of one’s DH-component and its peer’s public-key (say
Acy and Bdx), are SK-secure in the CK-framework w.r.t. any test-session between a pair of different
players.
Proof. According to the SK-security definition in the CK-framework, we need to prove OAKE and
sOAKE satisfy the following two requirements:
Requirement-1. If two parties Aˆ, Bˆ complete matching sessions, then their session-keys are the same.
Requirement-2. Under the GDH assumption, there is no feasible adversary that succeeds in distin-
guishing the session-key of an unexposed session with non-negligible probability.
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The Requirement-1 can be trivially checked for both OAKE and sOAKE. In the following, we focus
on establishing the Requirement-2.
Denote by (Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0) the unexposed test-session between a pair of uncorrupted players Aˆ and
Bˆ where Aˆ 6= Bˆ, and by HK(v) the session-key of the test-session that is referred to as the test HDR-
signature, where v = AcyXdb+ey = BdxY ca+ex. As HK is a random oracle, there are only two strategies
for the adversary A to distinguish HK(v) from a random value:
Key-replication attack. A succeeds in forcing the establishment of a session (other than the test-
session or its matching session) that has the same session-key output as the test-session. In this
case, A can learn the test-session key by simply querying the session to get the same key (without
having to learn the value of the test HDR-signature).
Forging attack. At some point in its run, A queries the RO HK with the value v. This implies that A
succeeds in computing or learning the test HDR-signature (i.e., the session-key of the test-session)
via its attacks. For presentation simplicity, we assume A directly outputs the session-key of the
test-session, referred to as the test-signature, via a successful forging attack.
The possibility of key-replication attack is trivially ruled out unconditionally in the RO model, by the
NMJPOK and TBSS property of OAKE and sOAKE. Specifically, for any session-tag (Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y )
and for any value σ ∈ G \ 1G, the probability Pr[KAˆ = KBˆ = σ] ≤
1
2l−1
holds for both OAKE and
sOAKE, where the probability is taken over only the choice of the random function h. Then, by the
birthday paradox (as done in the previous NMJPOK and computational fairness analysis), any efficient
attacker can succeed in the key-replication attack only with negligible probability. Actually, as the
test-session and its matching session are defined without taking public-keys into account in the CK-
framework, the possibility of key-replication attack is trivially ruled out unconditionally in the RO model
also for the public-key free variant of (s)OAKE. Specifically, for any test-session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ) and any
session (Aˆ′, Bˆ′,X ′, Y ′) that is unmatched to the test-session (which implies that at least of the following
inequalities holds: Aˆ 6= Aˆ′, Bˆ 6= Bˆ′, X 6= X ′ and Y 6= Y ′), it holds that Pr[KAˆ = KAˆ′ ] =
1
2l−1
. As
the attacker is polynomial-time, it cannot make two unmatched sessions to output the same session-key
with non-negligible probability.
Note on security reduction tightness. We note that, however, the analysis of HMQV to rule
out key-replication attack in [37] is quite complicated, and is still reduced to the underlying hardness
assumptions (to be precise, to the unforgeability of HMQV-HDR). That is, the analysis of (s)OAKE
in order to rule out the key-replication attacks is not only much simpler, but also does not go through
costly security reductions.Also, as we shall see, sOAKE is at least as tight as HMQV in other parts of
the security analysis. We did not try to make a direct comparison on the security reduction tightness
between OAKE and HMQV, as they use different forking lemma.
Then, in the following analysis, we only focus on ruling out the forging attack. Recall that Aˆ 6= Bˆ
for the test-session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0) held by Aˆ. In the rest, we make analysis mainly with respect to the
OAKE protocol, the similar and actually simpler hold also for sOAKE.
Now, suppose there is an efficient KE-attacker A who succeeds, by forging attacks, against the
test-session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0) with Aˆ 6= Bˆ (particularly, A 6= B), we present an efficient forger F against
the underlying OAKE-HDR signature, which contradicts the security of the underlying OAKE-HDR
signature scheme (that is based on the GDH assumption), and thus establishing the theorem. F works
as follows, by running A as a subroutine.
1. We assume F successfully guessed the unexposed test-session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0) held at Aˆ, where
Aˆ 6= Bˆ.
2. The inputs of F are (B,X0), and F has oracle access to the OAKE-HDR signer Bˆ of public-key
B.
3. F sets the inputs to all parties other than Bˆ, and thus can perfectly emulate these parties. In
particular, F can deal with state-reveal queries, session-key queries by A on any session other
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than the test-session and its matching session, and party corruption queries on any party other
than Aˆ and Bˆ.
4. When A activates a session at Bˆ, either as a responder or initiator, with peer identity Pˆ of
public-key P and incoming message X, then F feeds Bˆ the value (Pˆ , P,X). In response, F gets
values (y, Y, P cy) from Bˆ, and then F hands A the value Y as the outgoing message from Bˆ.
Actually, the values (y, Y, P cy) can be offline pre-computed by Bˆ, and leaked to F (and A ) prior
to the session involving them.
5. When A issues a state-reveal query against an incomplete session (Bˆ, Pˆ , Y ) (not matching to the
test-session) held at Bˆ, then F returns the values (Y, y, P cy) to A .
6. When A issues a session-key query to a session (Bˆ, Pˆ , Y,X) (not matching to the test-session)
held at Bˆ, then F queries the session-signature from its signing oracle Bˆ by presenting the signing
oracle with (Pˆ , P,X, Y ), and returns the HDR-signature from Bˆ to A .
7. When A halts with a valid test-signature, denoted σ0, F stops and outputs σ0.
Suppose there are n parties in total in the system, and each party is activated at mostm times (where
n and m are polynomials in the security parameter), in actual analysis F guesses the test-session by
choosing uniformly at random a triple (Pˆi, Pˆj , t) (hoping that Pˆi = Aˆ and Pˆj = Bˆ and the test-session
is the t-th session activated at Aˆ with peer Bˆ), where 1 ≤ i 6= j ≤ n and 1 ≤ t ≤ m. Thus, with
probability (n2m)−1, F successfully guesses the test-session. It is easy to check that, conditioned on F
successfully checks the test-session, the view of A under the run of F is identical to that in the real run
of A . Suppose A successfully outputs, with non-negligible probability ε, the valid test-signature via
forging attack in its real run, with still non-negligible probability (n2m)−1ε A (and thus F) outputs
the valid test-signature under the run of F .
We need then to check whether the valid test HDR-signature outputted by F is a successful OAKE-
HDR forgery. As the test-signature output by A is valid, according to Definition 5.2, we only need to
show the vector {Aˆ, A,X0, Y0} did not appear in any one of the responses from the signing oracle Bˆ.
We distinguish three cases, according to the appearance of Y0:
Case-1. Y0 was never output in any one of the signatures issued by Bˆ. In this case, the test HDR-
signature output by A (and thus F) is clearly a successful forgery against OAKE-HDR.
Case-2. Y0 was output in one of the signatures issued by Bˆ in a session non-matching to the test-
session. Denote by (Bˆ, Pˆ , Y0,X) this non-matching session, we have that Pˆ 6= Aˆ or X 6= X0.
That is, (Pˆ , P,X) 6= (Aˆ, A,X0). As Bˆ uses random and independent DH-components in each
session, the value Y0 is only used in this non-matching session (Bˆ, Pˆ , Y0,X), and thus does not
appear (except for a negligible probability of accidental repetition) in any other signatures issued
by Bˆ in other sessions different from (Bˆ, Pˆ , Y0,X). Putting all together, we get that {Aˆ, A,X0, Y0}
did not appear in any of the HDR-signatures issued by Bˆ, and thus the test HDR-signature output
by F is a successful forgery against OAKE-HDR.
Case-3. Y0 was generated by Bˆ in the matching session (Bˆ, Aˆ, Y0,X0). However, this matching session
was never queried by A via session-key query or session-state query (recall we assume the test-
session and its matching session are unexposed in the CK-framework), which in turn implies that
F never queries Bˆ for the HDR-signature of this matching session. Also, the random value Y0
was used by Bˆ only for this matching session (except for a negligible probability of accidental
repetition). This implies that, in Case-3, the values {Aˆ, A,X0, Y0} also did not appear in any one
of the responses from the signing oracle Bˆ, and thus the test HDR-signature output by F is a
successful forgery against OAKE-HDR. 
Notes on the security analysis of (s)OAKE in the CK-framework. For the above security
analysis of (s)OAKE in the CK-framework, we have the following observations and notes:
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• For the same security level (actually, whenever the DH-component is offline pre-computed and
exposable, no matter whether the secret DH-exponent is exposable or not), the security of HMQV
in the CK-framework relies on both the GDH assumption and the KEA assumption. In contrast,
for the security of (s)OAKE even with the additional powerful exposure of DH-exponents and Acy
or Bdx, the KEA assumption is dispensed with.
• The security reduction (from the security of sOAKE to the security of the underlying HDR sig-
natures) is tighter than that of HMQV.
We remind problems with security reduction in the random oracle model [12, 48, 52, 13]. Here,
we only aimed to highlight the relative advantage of reduction tightness of sOAKE over HMQV,
as both HMQV and (s)OAKE are proved in the random oracle model.
• Note that the above security analysis is actually w.r.t. the public-key free variants of (s)OAKE,
with players’ public-keys removed from the inputs of the functions of c, d, e. The reason is that
the security of the underlying OAKE-HDR/sOAKE-HDR signatures does not rely on them.
• The analysis shows that OAKE and sOAKE remain their security in the CK-framework, even if
the attacker A exposes the private values (y,Acy) of the matching session (but not the session-key
itself). This provides extra security guarantee of (s)OAKE that is beyond the CK-framework. The
reason is that, even if these pre-computed private values are used by Bˆ in the matching session
(Bˆ, Aˆ, Y0,X0) and exposed to A , the forger F never queries the full HDR-signature corresponding
to this matching session as the underlying attacker A is not allowed to make the session-key query
against the matching session (note that F queries the HDR signer for a full session-signature only
when A makes the session-key query against this session), and thus (Aˆ, A,X0, Y0) still did not
appear in any one of the signatures issued by Bˆ.
Using Corollary G.1 and Corollary G.2, we have the following corollaries about the security of
(s)OAKE in the CK-framework w.r.t. any test-session between the identical players Aˆ = Bˆ. The proofs
are straightforward adaptations of the proof of Theorem G.3, and details are omitted here.
Corollary G.3 Under the CDH assumption in the RO model, the OAKE and sOAKE protocols (ac-
tually, the variants with public-keys removed from the inputs of c, d, e), with offline pre-computed and
exposable DH-components, DH-exponents, and the DH-secrets of one’s DH-component and its peer’s
public-key (say Acy and Bdx), are SK-secure in the CK-framework w.r.t. any test-session of identical
peer and identical DH-component (i.e., Aˆ = Bˆ and X = Y ).
Corollary G.4 Under the GDH assumption and additionally the KEA assumption in the RO model,
the OAKE and sOAKE protocols (actually, the variants with public-keys removed from the inputs of
c, d, e), with offline pre-computed and exposable DH-components, DH-exponents, and the DH-secrets of
one’s DH-component and its peer’s public-key (say Acy and Bdx), are SK-secure in the CK-framework
w.r.t. any test-session of identical peer but different DH-components (i.e., Aˆ = Bˆ but X 6= Y ).
Notes on some inherent security limitations. The reader should beware of some inherent
security limitations for any one-round and two-round implicitly-authenticated DHKE protocols, e.g.,
the PFS vulnerability for any two-round implicitly-authenticated DHKE and the KCI vulnerability for
any one-round DHKE (more details are referred to [37]). Even for the three-round version of OAKE
(as well as HMQV) with explicit mutual authentications, there are also some inherent limitations. For
example, the protocol responder may not be able to get deniability in a fair way, in case the malicious
protocol initiator just aborts after receiving the second-round message; Also, both the three-round
OAKE and (H)MQV suffer from the cutting-last-message attack [41], etc. We remark that losing
deniability fairness to protocol responder and lacking correct delivery guarantee of the last message
are inherent to the protocol structure of OAKE and (H)MQV and do not violate the definition of the
SK-security in the CK-framework, which though can be easily remedied but at the price of ruining the
performance advantages and/or adding additional system complexity.
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H Security of (s)OAKE Beyond the CK-framework
Following Section 4.2, in this section we make some further investigations on the security properties of
(s)OAKE not captured by the CK-framework, which further strengthens the security guarantee of the
(s)OAKE protocols. The first observation is: the security analysis of (s)OAKE in the CK-framework
also implies that (s)OAKE is resistant to reflection attacks.
H.1 Security with Public Computations
The work of [39] considers a new attack scenario for key-exchange protocols with public computations,
where it is convenient to split an entity (performing a run of KE-protocol) into two parts: a trusted
authentication device, and an untrusted computing device. The authentication device enforces the
confidentiality of the authentication data, while some computing operations required by the protocol are
publicly carried out by the (possibly untrusted) computing device. This allows to use an authentication
device with little computing power, and to make computing devices independent from users [39].
The work [39] gives some concrete applications that might be benefited from public computations:
(1) Mobile phones include smart cards which store the user authentication data; the handsets themselves
are the computing devices. (2) PCs (corresponding to the computing device) equipped with a crypto
token (corresponding to the authentication device) have a lot more computing power than the token
itself, but may be plagued by spyware or virus. For more details, the reader is referred to [39].
(H)MQV with public computations. With the computation of Bˆ as an example (the same holds
for Aˆ), a natural split of authentication computation and public computation is as follows [39]: The
authentication device generates (y, Y ), forwards Y to the computation device; After getting (Aˆ,X) from
the computation device, the authentication device computes s = y + eb, where e = h(Y, Aˆ), and then
forwards s to the computation device; After getting s from the authentication device, the computation
device computes KBˆ = (XA
d)s, and then the session-key, and then communicate with Aˆ with the
session-key.
One key point is: as we assume the computation device may not be trustful, once the value s is
leaked to an attacker (who may compromise the computation device), then the attacker can definitely
impersonate Bˆ to Aˆ in any sessions. Note that, by only compromising the computation device, the
attacker does not learn the DH-exponent y and the private-key b. This shows that (H)MQV does not
well support deployment in the public computation model.
(s)OAKE with public computations. For applications in such scenarios, the natural split of
authentication computation and public computation for (s)OAKE is as follows, with the computation of
Bˆ as an example (the similar hold for Aˆ): (1) The authentication device generates (y, Y ) and possibly
Acy (in case the authentication device has learnt the peer identity Aˆ) where c = 1 for sOAKE or
c = h(Aˆ, A, Y ) for OAKE, and then forwards Y and possibly Acy to the computation device; (2)
After getting X from the computation device, the authentication device computes s = db + ey, where
d = h(Bˆ, B, Y ) and e = h(X,Y ) for OAKE (resp., d = 1 and e = h(Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y ) for sOAKE),
and then forwards s to the computation device; (3) After getting s from the authentication device,
the computation device computes KBˆ = A
cyXs, and then the session-key, and then communicate with
Aˆ with the session-key. Note that y, Y, c, d,Acy , db can be offline pre-computed by the authentication
device, and the authentication device can only online compute ey and s. Also, the computation device
essentially needs to compute only one exponentiation Xs.
Below, we make some discussions about the security of sOAKE and OAKE in the public computation
model.4
Discussion on security of sOAKE with public computations. We note that, under the DLP
assumption, the knowledge of (Ay, s) of a session of sOAKE, learnt by the adversary by compromising
the computation device, is essentially useless for the attacker to violate other sessions other than the
4We note that some modifications to (s)OAKE may be needed to give a formal proof in the public computation model,
in accordance with the work of [39]. Here, we stress that (s)OAKE, particularly sOAKE, very well supports the public-
computation model even without such modifications.
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matching session (Bˆ, Aˆ, Y,X). The reason is that s = b+ ey for sOAKE, where e = h(Aˆ, A, Bˆ,B,X, Y )
commits to the whole session-tag. Thus, the value s cannot be used by the attacker to violate a non-
matching session, unless it can compute y from Ay (and thus b from s) which however is infeasible by
the DLP assumption.
Discussion on security of OAKE with public computations. The knowledge (Acy, s) of a ses-
sion of OAKE, where s = db+ ey, d = h(Bˆ, B, Y ) and e = h(X,Y ), is essentially useless under the DLP
assumption for the attacker to violate other sessions other than sessions of the tag (Aˆ∗, A∗, Bˆ, B,X, Y )
where (Aˆ∗, A∗) may be different from (Aˆ, A). As the DH-component X is generated by uncorrupted
players randomly and independently, it implies that the knowledge of (Acy, s) can only help the attacker
to violate the security of at most one unexposed non-matching session.
For example, consider that the attacker interacts concurrently with Aˆ (in the name of Bˆ) and Bˆ (in
the name of Aˆ∗ 6= Aˆ but of the same public-key A); the attacker faithfully relays the DH-components
X and Y in the two sessions; in case the attacker learns both s and the private-key a of Aˆ, then it can
impersonate Bˆ to Aˆ in the unique session in which Aˆ sends X.
We remark this weakness is at the price of supporting the advantageous post-ID computability
offered by OAKE. Though this weakness can be trivially remedied (by putting Aˆ into d and Bˆ into
c), but at the price of sacrificing the advantage of post-ID computability. Even with this (seemingly
unreasonable) weakness in the public computation model for OAKE in mind, the potential damage
caused is still much mitigated in comparison with that of (H)MQV in such scenarios.
H.2 Resistance to KCI, and Weak PFS
Recall that the security of DHKE protocols in the CK-framework is w.r.t. an unexposed test-session
(Aˆ, Bˆ,X0, Y0), where Aˆ and Bˆ are uncorrupted parties (which implies both the private-keys a, b are not
exposed to the attacker) but the value Y0 may be generated by the attacker impersonating Bˆ (in this
case, the matching session does not exist). In this section, we consider the security damage caused by
compromising static secret-keys of players, i.e., one or both of the secret-keys a, b of the test-session are
exposed to the attacker.
Firstly, we note that if both the peer Bˆ (in the test-session) is corrupted and the value Y0 is
generated by the attacker itself, then no security can be guaranteed for the test-session within the
CK-framework (as the attacker can now compute the session-key by itself). In this section, we mainly
investigate the resistance against key-compromise impersonation (KCI) attacks, and perfect forward
security (PFS). Roughly speaking, a key-compromise impersonation attack is deemed successful if the
attacker, knowing the private key a of a party Aˆ (which of course allows the attacker to impersonate Aˆ),
is able to impersonate another different uncorrupted party Bˆ 6= Aˆ (for which the attacker does not know
the secret-key b) to Aˆ. Note that for KCI attacks, the attacker still can generate the DH-component
Y0 for the test-session (without the matching session then). The PFS property says that the leakage of
the static secret-key of a party should not compromise the security of session-keys ever established by
that party, and erased from memory before the leakage occurred.
Definition H.1 (clean session [37]) We say that a complete session of a key-exchange protocol is
clean, if the attacker did not have access to the session’s state at the time of session establishment (i.e.,
before the session is complete), nor it issued a session-key query against the session after completion.
Note that, for a clean session at an uncorrupted party, the attacker did not issue a state-reveal query
while the session was incomplete or a session-key query after completion; Moreover, the attacker was
not actively controlling or impersonating the party during the session establishment (neither by making
any choices on behalf of that party in that session or eavesdropping into the session’s state).
Definition H.2 [37] We say that a KE-attacker A that has learned the static secret-key of Aˆ succeeds
in a KCI attack against Aˆ, if A is able to distinguish from random the session-key of a complete session
at Aˆ for which the session peer Bˆ 6= Aˆ is uncorrupted (which implies the private-key of Bˆ is not exposed
to A ) and the session and its matching session (if it exists) are clean.
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In other words, the definition says that, as long as the attacker is not actively controlling or ob-
serving the secret choices (particularly the ephemeral DH-exponent x) of the test-session, then even the
knowledge of Aˆ’s private-key still does not allow A to compromise the session-key. In particular, in
such a protocol A cannot impersonate an uncorrupted party Bˆ to Aˆ in a way that allows A to learn
any information about the resultant session-key [37] (even if the attacker impersonates Bˆ and generates
the DH-component, say Y0, by itself).
Proposition H.1 Under the GDH assumption in the random oracle model, the OAKE and sOAKE
protocols (actually, their public-key free variants), with offline pre-computation, resist KCI attacks in
the CK-framework.
The resistance of (s)OAKE to KCI attacks is essentially implied by the proof of Theorem G.2 and
the proof of Theorem G.3, from the observations that: for KCI attacks the test-session is of different
uncorrupted peers Aˆ 6= Bˆ, and the security of the underlying OAKE-HDR/sOAKE-HDR hold even if
the forger learns the private-key of the uncorrupted peer (the party Aˆ here).
Weak PFS (wPFS). It is clarified in [37] that, no 2-round DHKE protocols with implicit key
confirmation can fully render PFS security (the 3-round versions of HMQV and (s)OAKE, with explicit
key-confirmation and mutual authentications, do fully provide PFS property). The work [37] formulates
a weak notion of PFS, named weak PFS (wPFS), and shows that HMQV satisfies this wPFS property.
Roughly speaking, wPFS property says that if the attacker is not actively involved with the choices of
X,Y at a session (particularly if it does not get to choose or learn the DH-exponent x or y), then the
resultant session-key does enjoy forward security. Formally,
Definition H.3 [37] A key-exchange protocol provides wPFS, if an attacker A cannot distinguish from
random the key of any clean session (Aˆ, Bˆ,X, Y ), where Y is also generated by an uncorrupted party in
a clean session, even if A has learned the private keys of both Aˆ and Bˆ.
Proposition H.2 Under the CDH assumption (rather than the stronger GDH assumption), the OAKE
and sOAKE protocols provide wPFS property in the random oracle model.
For establishing the wPFS property for (s)OAKE, we do not need here to construct a OAKE-
HDR/sOAKE-HDR forger from the attacker violating the wPFS property. Actually, we can directly
reduce the loss of wPFS to the CDH assumption, from the following observations: given the knowledge
of both a and b, the computation of KAˆ or KBˆ is reduced to the computation of g
xye from the random
DH-components X,Y . Recall that, for wPFS property, we assume the attacker is not actively involved
with the choices of X,Y . Then, we can simply guess the test-session, and set the DH-components as
some random elements X,Y , and then reduce the ability of the attacker to violate wPFS directly to the
CDH assumption. More details are omitted here.
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